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I have great respect for the judges and courts of the United
States. However, if my understanding of the [Morton] decision
...is correct, then I must conclude that the court was either
misled or did not understand the day-to-day workings of the
state regulatory process ....

Stanley C. DuRose
Wisconsin Insurance Commissioner in 1970
Consider a case where a court hands down a judgment that a defendant perpetrated a pervasive fraud upon victims in every state in
the country years ago. Oddly, no alleged victim had ever brought a
complaint against the defendant. While the purported victims were
readily available, they were never approached for information about
the alleged misconduct. Indeed, there was no trial on any of the issues. The only "testimony" came from briefs submitted to an appellate court citing law journal articles written by attorneys who represent
parties in the same position as the plaintiff.
The defendant protests. He never had an opportunity to challenge the purported evidence submitted in the appellate court papers, much less at an evidentiary hearing. Nonetheless, he is
adjudged to have committed a heinous act for which he will become
subject to billions of dollars in claims.
After the news of this judgment becomes public, the so-called
"victims" of the alleged misconduct band together. On a nationwide
basis, they execute a host of affidavits swearing that they were not subjected to anything that remotely resembles the misconduct of which
the defendant was accused. Their affidavits attest that in all their dealings the defendant was honest and straightforward. The affidavits submitted by the "victims" cry out for the court to vacate the judgment
t Editor's note: On January 13, 1994, while this Article was being printed, the
New Jersey Supreme Court denied the motions for reconsideration in Morton
InternationaL
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entered and the harsh punishment imposed. A motion for a rehearing is pending, along with a request for an evidentiary hearing to afford the defendant his due process rights.
This scenario is not taken from the pages of a Kafka story of bizarre judicial proceedings, although it might have been. Instead, it
describes the events surrounding the recent opinion of the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Morton International,Inc. v. General Accident Insurance Company of America'
In Morton, New Jersey's highest court was asked to interpret what
is known as the "sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion. This
exclusion bars all coverage for claims arising out of pollution events,
unless the pollution "discharge" was both "sudden and accidental." 2
Insurers contended that the exclusion's language is plain. They asserted that the term "sudden" cannot be stripped of its temporal element. That is, for the "sudden and accidental" exception of the
exclusion to apply, the insured must prove that the pollution arose
out of a discharge that was abrupt. Those seeking coverage under the
exception contended that "sudden" means only "unexpected," and
that "sudden" also encompasses gradual processes. Insurers further
contended that the exclusion expressly requires that the "discharge"
be sudden and accidental; insureds argued that only the resulting
pollution damage need be sudden and accidental. In a word, the insurers asserted that the exception requires a, true pollution "accident,"
while insureds argued that the exception applies to gradual pollution
events.
The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with every one of the insurers' positions about the meaning of the exclusion's language.' The
1 134 N.J. 1, 629 A.2d 831 (1993), petition for reh'gfiled
Id. at 11, 629 A.2d at 836. The 1970 pollution exclusion endorsement, subsequently incorporated into the 1973 CGL policy as exclusion (f), stated that:
This insurance does not apply. .. (f) to bodily injuy or property damage
arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste
materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon
land, the atmosphere or any watercourse or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is
sudden and accidental.
Id. at 11-12, 629 A.2d at 836.
s Id. at 28-29, 629 A.2d at 847-48. Independent legal commentary also supports
the insurers' position regarding the temporal nature of pollution exclusion language.
See Developments in the Law - Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HAav. L. REv. 1458, 1576-77,
1582-1583 (1986) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] ("Most CGL forms contain a
'pollution exclusion' clause exempting the insurer from coverage for gradual polluting leaks ....
[These exclusions are] an attempt to remove gradual pollution from
the coverage of the comprehensive general liability policy. Most pollution exclusion
clauses, however, contain an exception for sudden and accidental releases of waste.").
2
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court, however, would not enforce what it found to be plain, unambiguous language. Instead, it imposed a novel "regulatory estoppel" remedy,4 under which it refused to enforce the exclusion as written
because it came to the "virtually inescapable" conclusion that the insurance industry deliberately misled the state insurance departments
which approved the exclusion in 1970.1 The "evidence" supporting
this conclusion was essentially a single piece of paper, a one paragraph "Explanation"forwarded to regulators by the Insurance Rating
Board (IRB) along with the new pollution exclusion endorsement.
The court concluded that the IRB's 1970 explanatory materials would
not have advised state regulators that the exclusion would effect the
sweeping reduction in coverage it then purportedly represented.
To reach its conclusions, the Morton court individually reviewed
each sentence in the IRB Explanation, and imposed its own presentday conclusions about how regulators would have understood each
proposition in 1970. No effort was made to ascertain how regulators
actually understood the IRB Explanationor the context in which it was
filed. As a result, the Morton analysis is based upon fictitious misdeeds
and motives.
I.

THE "WITNESSES" FOR THE PROSECUTION

The only source for the court's information about the IRB's
alleged misconduct was policyholder counsel. The briefs filed by
the policyholder litigants and their amici curiae contained allegations of 1970 insurance fraud. These allegations were said to be
corroborated by commentators, whose published articles were
cited as authorities. The commentators relied upon, however,
were other policyholder lawyers engaged in litigating the same coverage issues.' The court apparently was unaware of the partisanship of the authors upon whom it relied for its "facts," for they were
labeled "independent" in its opinion.' The court also relied upon
the observations of a few other courts that similarly relied upon
See also E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through the Looking
Glass, 74 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1251-53 (1986).
4 Morton, 134 N.J. at 73-77, 629 A.2d at 872-74.
5 See id. at 39, 629 A.2d at 853.
6 See id. at 31, 33, 629 A.2d at 84849 (citing Nancy Ballard & Peter M. Manus,
ClearingMuddy Waters: Anatomy of the Comprehensive GeneralLiability Pollution Exclusion,

75 Co.NELL L. Rxv. 610 (1990); Robert D. Chesler et al., PatternsofJudicialInterpretation of Insurance Coveragefor Hazardous Waste Site Liability, 18 RUrGERs L. J. 9 (1986);
Thomas M. Reiter et al., The Pollution Exclusion Under Ohio Law: Staying the Course, 59
U. CIN. L. REv. 1165 (1991)).
7

Id. at 29, 629 A.2d at 848.
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these commentaries in lieu of an evidentiary hearing.8
The insurers urged the court to refrain from extra-record
speculation and to remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing if
it was inclined to consider the "history" issues raised in policyholders' appellate briefs. 9 The court, however, not only considered the
hearsay evidence found in the commentaries, it exclusively focused
on it to find coverage under an estoppel analysis. The Morton court
asserted that a remand would be "redundant" because the "abundant independent commentary" addressing the exclusion's purported history afforded an "accurate and comprehensive basis for
[the court's] determination." 10
The IRB Explanation that the court focused upon reads in pertinent part:
Coverage for pollution or contamination is not provided in most
cases under present policies because the damages can be said to
be expected or intended and thus are excluded by the definition of occurrence. The above exclusion clarifies the situation
so as to avoid any question of intent. Coverage is continued for
pollution or contamination caused injuries when the pollution
or contamination results from an accident .... 11
The first sentence of the Explanationsets forth the insurance community's 1970 perception that, even under the existing 1966 "occurrence" comprehensive general liability (CGL) policy, very little
coverage was provided for pollution claims. The second sentence
states that, in this respect, the 1970 exclusion served to clarify that
coverage situation. The final sentence advised regulators that there
would still be coverage afforded for a pollution "accident."
Morton takes issue with every one of these statements in reaching
the "inescapable" conclusion that the IRB deliberately misled insurance regulators. 12 The court criticized the first two sentences of the
Explanation because it assumed that broad-based pollution coverage
was unconditionally provided under the 1966 "occurrence" CGL policy in use in 1970.15 The court also took issue with the IRB's use of
the term "accident." By imposing its 1993 interpretation that "accident" also encompassed gradual occurrences, the court worked backwards to its conclusion that the term "accident" was used in the
8 Id.

9 Neither affidavits nor the record on appeal supported the historical "facts"
which the court stated were "relatively uncontroverted." Id. at 31, 629 A.2d at 848.
10 Id. at 29, 629 A.2d at 848.
11 Id. at 36, 629 A.2d at 851.
12 Id. at 39, 629 A.2d at 853.
13 Id. at 31-33, 37-39, 629 A.2d at 848-49, 852-53.

19931

FICTION OFREGULATORY ESTOPPEL85

851

Explanationto mislead insurance regulators. 4
The court also concluded that by misrepresenting the effect of
the pollution exclusion, insurers deprived state insurance regulators
of the opportunity to reduce rates. It assumed that the 1970 approval
of the exclusion without an accompanying premium reduction meant
that the exclusion could not have been understood as a significant
restriction on coverage. Allegedly, the IRB's actions were aimed at
avoiding the rate reduction regulators would have been "obligated" to
impose had they understood the coverage restriction imposed. 15 As
will be demonstrated, all of these conclusions and assumptions have
no basis in fact.
II.

STATE INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS:

THE UNWILLING "VICTIMS"

According to Morton, the entire community of state insurance
regulators serving in and around 1970 were victimized by the insurers. Morton variously terms the IRB's presentation as "grossly misleading,"16 "industry's misrepresentation [s] ,'17 "paradigms of
understatement,""8 and "simply untrue." 19 Passing these characterizations the court assumed, without benefit of any testimony from
the regulators, that the regulators "would not readily have understood" the meaning or effect of the new exclusionary language. 0
In the short time between the issuance of the Morton opinion
and the preparation of this Article, a host of former insurance regulators from the operative era have come forward and refuted the
court's assumptions of industry misconduct and regulatory ignorance.2 1 For example, Jerome Steen, Primary Rate Analyst for the
New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance, evaluated the
pollution exclusion in 1970. His affidavit contradicts the court's
speculation about what transpired during the New Jersey approval
process:
629 A.2d
Id.
Id. at 29, 629 A.2d
Id. at 30, 629 A.2d
18 Id. at 37, 629 A.2d
14 Id. at 39,
15
16
17

at 853.

at 847.
at 848.
at 852.

19 Id.

Id. at 30, 629 A.2d at 848.
The list of affiants and the affidavits of those referred to in this article are found
in the attached Addendum. The affiants are insurance regulators from Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming,
20
21
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It is my understanding that, with regard to the 1970 pollution
exclusion filings, there now exists opinions [sic] that the Department [of Banking and Insurance] was either misled by the supporting justification provided by filers or that it misunderstood
the significance of the subject filings. Neither consideration is,
in fact, valid, as is indicated here and in Department documents
22
in connection with these filings.
The testimony of the former regulators shows that the IRB Explanation was accurate and that the regulators understood both the plain
language of the pollution exclusion and its effect.
III.

THE

1970

PERCEPTION OF THE EXCLUSION'S IMPACT ON
POLLUTION COVERAGE

The Morton court declared that the exclusion should have
been perceived and communicated as a "sweeping" change in coverage. 23 The court considered the exclusion a "monumental" reduction of existing coverage, 24 a "substantial" and "severe"
2 6
restriction of coverage, 25 and a "radical diminution" in coverage.
The court, however, misperceived the actual 1970 situation regarding pollution and related insurance coverage. Because of this
foundational error, Morton's subsequent observations and inferences, particularly relating to the IRB Explanation, are unsound.
The exclusion was promulgated many years before comprehensive environmental regulatory statutes imposed joint, several,
retroactive, and strict liability upon policyholders. Contrary to how
Morton now perceives the impact of the exclusion, in 1970 it was
not perceived as accomplishing a "radical diminution" of coverage.
At that time, insurers and regulators understood that policyholders
would or should be aware of pollution damage resulting from routine business operations, and that the gradual pollution arising
from such operations was not fortuitous. Thus, in 1970, the existing scope of "occurrence" coverage for pollution claims was understood to be narrow. Independent legal commentators have
recognized this over the years. 27 In the context of this understand22
23

Aft. of Jerome Steen 3.
Morton, 134 N.J. at 30, 629 A.2d at 848.

24

Id. at 38, 629 A.2d at 853.

25

Id. at 41, 72, 629 A.2d at 854, 872.

26

Id. at 74, 629 A.2d at 873.
See Eric M. Holmes, Applicability of Liability Insurance Coverage to PrivatePollution

27

Suits: Do We Insure Pollution?, 40 TENN. L. REv. 377, 391 (1973) ("Another indication
of how 'expected' might be construed is found in the rule that an injury that is the
natural and probable consequence of an act does not arise from an accident."); Werner Pfennigstorf, Environment, Damages, and Compensation, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
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ing, the IRB Explanation was an accurate reflection of those conditions, and not a misrepresentation of the effect of the 1970
exclusion.
The former state regulators have confirmed this. For example, the former Montana Insurance Commissioner states:
Pollution claims were extremely rare in 1970. In most cases,
those few claims were already precluded by the coverage limitation the occurrence definition placed on expected or intended
damage. In 1970, it was a matter of common knowledge that
damages caused by routine and repetitive business practices
were not covered occurrences. That damage should be expected, and was a cost of doing business. It was not an insurable
risk. 8
Similarly, the former Utah General Rates and Forms Analyst states:
While I am sure pollution was taking place at that period of
time, I don't think we ever had a pollution claim. I always
thought repetitive business pollution was a cost of doing business. The damage it caused would most likely be expected. The
first sentence of the Explanation indicates the Bureau [IRB]
thought so also.2 9
And the former Insurance Commissioner of Kentucky concludes:
Pollution claims were not common back at that time. In most
cases, even those claims would generally be precluded by the
language of the occurrence definition. It was understood that
pollution damage resulting from routine normal business operations was or should have been expected. It was a cost of doing
business. The pollution exclusion did clarify the general lack of
pollution coverage in 1970.30
This understanding also prevailed in New York, where the pollution exclusion was reviewed by a Senior Insurance Examiner in that
state's Insurance Department. He states:
I was not surprised to see the Explanationstate that "most cases"
of pollution caused expected or intended damage. In those
days virtually all pollution damage was caused by regular business pollution discharges, and pollution coverage claims were
349, 439 ("the authors of [the occurrence] clause did not intend to cover pollution

damages that resulted as a natural and obvious consequence from the regular operation of a business"); Jerry E. Cardwell, Note, Insuranceand Its Role in the Struggle Between
Protecting Pollution Victims and the Producers of Pollution, 31 DRAKE L. REv. 913, 922
(1982) ("it seems clear that the authors of the [occurrence] clause did not intend to
cover pollution damages that resulted as a natural and obvious consequence from the

regular operations of a business").
28 Aff. of Elmer V. Omholt 1 4.
29

Aff. of Melvin L. Summerhays

30

Aff. of Robert D. Preston 1 4.

7.
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few. I agreed with the Explanation that this situation of general
lack of "occurrence" pollution coverage was clarified by eliminating coverage for gradual pollution discharges. 3 '
The Morton decision singles out the filing in Kansas as failing to
disclose the full impact of the pollution exclusion clause.3 2 The Kansas Fire and Casualty Supervisor has completely repudiated Morton's
conclusion that his department acted in ignorance:
It was clear to me that the sudden and accidental pollution
exclusion was meant (and was understood) to retain "occurrence" coverage for claims other than those involving pollutants
or contaminants. Pollution claims were to be covered only on
the narrower basis of sudden and accidental.
It is my opinion that the Department was not misled by
either the exclusion or the IRB's explanation. It was obvious
that coverage was being reduced. That was why we inquired
about whether the exclusion could be deleted and coverage afforded through a "buy back." We also would not allow the exclusion to be attached to existing policies because, in our
opinion, it potentially reduced coverage."3
The Morton court seemed to have overlooked the historical prerequisite to liability coverage: the absolute necessity of fortuity. For
example, one commentary relied upon by the court' asserted that
gradual pollution was covered under the 1966 "occurrence" CGL, citing an excerpt from a 1965 speech made by Lyman Baldwin, an executive of the Insurance Company of North America:
Let us consider how this would apply in a fairly commonplace
situation where we have a chemical manufacturing plant which
during the course of its operations emits noxious fumes that
damage the paint on buildings in the surrounding neighborhood. Under the new policy there is coverage until such time as
35
the insured becomes aware that the damage was being done.
The error that arises from reliance upon this commentator's excerpt, instead of examining the source document in full, is demonstrated by the balance of Baldwin's remarks. In full context, Baldwin's
concluding sentence of the quoted paragraph expressed a universal
31 Aff. of Henry L. Lauer
32

6.

Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 134 N.J. 1, 40-41, 629

A.2d 831, 854 (1993).
33 Aff. of Raymond E. Rathert 1 6, 7.

Morton, 134 N.J. at 33, 629 A.2d at 849 (citing Reiter, supra note 6, at 1191).
Reiter, supra note 6, at 1192-93 n.115 (quoting LymanJ. Baldwin,Jr., Address to
the American Society of Insurance Management, New Orleans (Oct. 20, 1965)). The
Wisconsin Supreme Court also cited to the Reiter article in Just v. Land Reclamation,
34
35

Ltd., 465 N.W.2d 570, 574 (Wisc. 1990).
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understanding: the essential prerequisite for "occurrence" coverage
was the absence of an objectively reasonable anticipation of damage.
Baldwin finished by stating that "[n]aturally, if he [the insured] could
reasonably have anticipated that the damage would ensue there would
be no coverage at all for it certainly would not have been unexpected."3 6 Thus, Baldwin's address did not support the proposition
that there was broad unconditional coverage for normal operational
37
pollution events under the 1966 CGL occurrence policy.
Another article cited in Morton stands diametrically opposed to
the proposition for which it was relied upon. The Morton court stated
that one author concluded that the 1966 policy was "tailor-made" to
cover most pollution claims.3 8 In the excerpt cited, however, the author was describing the insurance industry's concern that some courts
might interpret the occurrence definition to cover gradual pollution
arising from routine business operations. The commentator clearly
noted that the insurance industry never intended to cover most pollution claims: "Significantly, the insurers never intended to cover the
vast majority of pollution related claims ....The 'occurrence' defini36 See Lyman J. Baldwin Jr, Address to the American Society of Insurance Management (October 20, 1965) (on file with authors).
37 The Reiter article relied on by the Morton and Just courts similarly misconstrues
a speech by Gilbert Bean of Liberty Mutual as an expression that the 1966 CGL had
expanded pollution coverage significantly. See Reiter, supra note 6, at 1191-92 (citing
Gilbert Bean, Speech to the Mutual Insurance Technical Conference (Nov. 15,
1965)). The 1966 policy involved the changeover from the traditional "accident" to
.occurrence" coverage. Bean's speech focused on this temporal expansion of
coverage:
The scope of coverage, as you well know by now, is considerably broader
than previously, meeting legitimate needs of insureds for protection
against gradual as well as sudden injury or damage ....Our new occurrence basis includes the gradual injury or damage which may result
from either accident or exposure to conditions.
Gilbert Bean, Paper presented to the Mutual Insurance Technical Conference (Nov.
15, 1965) (emphasis added) (on file with authors).
Bean did not address in his 1965 speech the prerequisite under both the 1966
CGL and its predecessor that harm be fortuitous; the natural and probable result of
an insured's normal operational business conduct, whether swift or slow, was not covered. Bean had already addressed the fortuity prerequisite in a 1959 speech. Gilbert
L. Bean, The Accident Versus the Occurrence Concept, 439 INS. L. J. 550 (Sept. 1959). In
the previous speech Bean stressed the necessity for a "strong requirement" of fortuity
when insuring gradual property damage, so that "irresponsible" business conduct resulting in "probable injury" would not be covered. Harms resulting from an insured's
conduct had to be "inadvertent." Id. at 555 ("I've already mentioned that gradual
property damage was an area which involved considerable moral hazard. It would not
be advisable to insure in this area without the protection of a strong requirement that
coverage apply only if the gradual property damage were inadvertent.").
38 Morton, 134 N.J. at 38, 629 A.2d at 852 (citing Rosenkranz, supra note 3, at
1251).
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tion was not intended to cover pollution related losses that were 'natural and obvious consequence[s] [of] the regular operation of a
business.'
The concern described by the author helps explain why the industry sought clarification so that pollution never intended to be covered would not be the subject of claims. The Morton court's
misapprehension of the scope of pollution coverage afforded under
the 1966 CGL policy led it astray in its analysis of the IRB Explanation
regarding the effect of the pollution exclusion in 1970. Without appreciating that most pollution claims were already viewed to be noninsurable, normal operational business risks, the court failed to understand that the IRB Explanationwas accurate and straightforward.
"9

IV.

THE

REGULATORY RATING ANALYsIs

Morton's misperception that the 1970 pollution exclusion was a
radical diminution of coverage from the 1966 CGL inexorably led
the court to its confused analysis of the lack of premium reduction,
including its "inescapable" conclusion that approval of the 1970
exclusion required a "significant reduction" in the premium. The
court suggested that a desire to avoid such reduction motivated the
industry to misrepresent the effect of the 1970 exclusion.4"
Ironically, evidence before the court showed that no rate reduction was indicated. Policyholder amicus curiae, the State of New
Jersey, argued that, if the exclusion was meant to reduce coverage
in 1970, the New Jersey Department of Insurance would have rebated rates which had been "increased" in 1966 when occurrence
coverage was initiated.4 1 Morton unquestioningly accepted this argument and echoed how the industry "profited" by "maintaining
pre-existing rates" despite the new exclusion.4 2
Insurers had, however, charged no premium "increase" in
1966 when the basic policy began to cover some gradual property
damage. 4' Thus, there was no reason to reduce premiums due to
the exclusion of gradual pollution claims, particularly when most
such claims were already understood to be excluded as non-fortuitous, ordinary costs of doing business.
Rosenkranz, supra note 3, at 1248 (quoting Cardwell, supra note 27, at 922.
See Morton, 134 N.J. at 75, 629 A.2d at 874.
Id. at 36, 629 A.2d at 851. See also Brief for Amicus Curiae State Of NewJersey at
33-37, Morton (No. C-3956-85).
42 Morton, 134 N.J. at 80, 629 A.2d at 876.
43 See, e.g., Appendix of Brief for Amicus Curiae State Of New Jersey at 58-59, 62,
Morton (No. C-3956-85) (incorporating documents obtained from the files of the New
Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance).
39
40
41
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Like the pollution exclusion, the regulatory filing of the 1966
CGL occurrence policy was accompanied by explanatory materials
submitted to all state regulators. One of those documents explained, "the broadening of coverage ...on an 'occurrence' basis
is accomplished without an increase in rates."4 4 The regulatory history submitted by amicus, State of New Jersey, not only fails to support the court's conclusion that a rebate would have been required
in 1970, it demonstrates that there was no prior increase to be
rebated.
Morton also discusses another "rate-making" proposition: rates
must focus upon the "loss experience of the insurer, past and prospective."4 5 The court apparently assumed that in 1970 there was
sufficient pollution "loss experience" to have formed a basis for
rate-making. However, in 1970 there was little "loss experience"
available regarding pollution claims. Without adequate loss data,
insurance regulators could not rate the exposure; without such
data, a premium reduction was not only inappropriate under regulatory principles, it was incalculable.
As New Jersey regulator Steen attests, this was precisely the
case in New Jersey in 1970:
As to the lack of an immediate rate adjustment to reflect
the subject change, there was no meaningful loss data then available to formulate a retrospective rate adjustment for the general
liability line. Nor was there a basis for apportioning any reduction among classes, based upon the relative effect of the change
on differing classes.
In such circumstances, it was an accepted procedure to allow existing rates to prevail, based on the consideration that future experience would reflect whatever effect the subject
provisions might have and, accordingly, rates would flow downward or upward based upon the actual specific effect on the
classes or classifications that would be affected. 46
Regulators from across the country similarly explain that the Morton analysis ignores normal and legally mandated regulatory rate-making principles. For example, the former Superintendent of Insurance
for the District of Columbia states:
44 See id. at 62 (reprinting MIRB "Filing Memorandum-Manuals of Liability Insurance" (Feb. 16, 1966)) (emphasis added). The MIRB filing was made in New
Jersey on February 16, 1966, and approved by the NewJersey Department of Banking
and Insurance on April 4, 1966, to be effective October 1, 1966. Id. at 56.
45 Morton, 134 NJ. at 73, 629 A.2d at 872 (quoting NJ STAT. ANN. 17:29A-11 (West
1985)).
46 Aff. of Jerome Steen 11 12, 13.
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With respect to a rate reduction, the exclusion would not
have required one. Adjusting the rate for every form change is
surely a fantasy. A rate change for the IRB pollution exclusion
could not have been computed. Pollution loss data was insufficient. In a major rate case here in the District, the United States
Court of Appeals (No. 74-1732, September Term 1974) stated
that I "utilized extremely reasonable methodology to reach a
complex calculation." They criticized the "theoretical derivaas opposed to reliance
tion of regulation" to compute 4rates,
7
upon actual figures experienced.
Similarly, the former Illinois Deputy Director of the Property and Liability Branch adds:
During my tenure as an insurance regulator in Illinois, I
understood that the lack of a premium reduction for an exclusion did not demonstrate that an exclusion could not restrict
coverage. This was especially so where loss data had not been
sufficiently developed. In 1970, there were not many pollution
loss data. Present day pollution laws did not
claims or related 48
exist at that time.
Morton's rate-making analysis also ignores the fact that many
states employed a "file and use" program. Insurance regulators did
not set rates in those states. Rather, the "marketplace" determined
rates. The former Minnesota Chief Assistant Rate Analyst (later Assistant Commissioner of Insurance) described this process:
In those days the Department maintained control over the approval of policy forms. However, we handled rates on a "file and
use" basis. In other words, we allowed free competition in the
markets to set rates. Thus, even if this pollution exclusion filing
had dramatically reduced coverage (which it didn't), we would
still not have required a rate adjustment on its approval.4 9
The same situation applied in New York according to a high ranking
official in that state's Insurance Department:
I recall that back around 1970 New York was an [sic] "file
and use" state. The carriers' rating bureaus suggested advisory
rates, and competition in the marketplace would govern rates.
Moreover, insurance departments would not have required premium reductions for exclusions, such as the pollution exclusion,
5 °
where there was no indication of change in loss data.
In light of the fact that the 1966 CGL revisions had not occa47 Aff. of Edward P. Lombard 1 5.
48

Aft. of Kevin M. Ryan 1 6.

49 AfT. of Thomas L. O'Malley

50 Aff. of Henry L. Lauer

1 10.

8.
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sioned a rate increase and that loss data in 1970 was insufficient to
calculate any rate relating to pollution claims, Morton's conclusion
that insurers were motivated to mislead regulators who would have
been "obligated" to reduce rates has no basis in fact, nor in the record
before the court.
V.

THE RESTRICTIVE ASPECT OF THE EXCLUSION INTENDED BY ITS

DRAFIRS WAS NOT KEPT "SECRET"
Morton recognizes that, as reflected in the plain language chosen, the internal "drafting" documents underlying the 1970 exclusion demonstrated an intent to limit pollution coverage to the
"classical" accident or "boom" event. 5 ' That drafting intent, however, was discounted as irrelevant. The Morton court declares that
subsequent "filings with the states are completely inconsistent with
that [drafting intent] ,,,52 quoting testimony from another case given
by a former New York Insurance Superintendent, presumably, as a
disinterested former commissioner.5" This was not the case.5 4
Morton concludes that the exclusion was not described as a
"clarification" until the regulatory approval process. 55 However,
even before the exclusion was drafted, its clarification aspect was
discussed. Internal drafting documents are consistent with the
public regulatory filing materials, as a comparison of the March 17,
1970 internal minutes and the public Explanation illustrate.5 6 Both
51 Morton Int'l Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 134 NJ. 1, 42, 629 A.2d
831, 855 (1993).
52 Id. at 43, 629 A.2d at 855 (quoting deposition testimony of Richard Stewart,
quoted in Robert Sayler, The Emperor's Newest Clothes, Revisionism and Retreat: The Insurer's Last Word on the Pollution Exclusion, 5 Ms.EY's LrIIG. REP.: INS., #46, 27, 46
(Oct. 8, 1991)).
53 Id. at 42-43, 629 A.2d at 855 (citation omitted).
54 Former New York Insurance Superintendent Richard E. Stewart has testified on
behalf of policyholders in numerous cases, for which testimony he has received substantial compensation. See discussion in Section VIII, infta Mr. Stewart did not personally participate in the decision-making discussions relating to the 1970 pollution
exclusion. See Aff. of Henry L. Lauer 1 3.
55 Morton, 134 NJ. at 43, 629 A.2d at 855 (quoting deposition testimony of Richard
Stewart, quoted in Saylor, supra note 52, at 27, 46).
56 As recorded in the Internal March 17, 1970 Drafting Minutes.
It was noted that coverage for pollution may not be provided in
most cases under present policies because the damage could be said to be
expected or intended and thus would be excluded by the definition of
occurrence and, therefore, the adoption of an exclusion could be said
to be a clarification,but a necessary one in order to avoid any question of
intent.
The committee agreed that a policy exclusion of pollution that
would run to bodily injury and property damage should be adopted for
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the drafting and the regulatory documents said: (1) "in most
cases" pollution claims were not covered under the 1966 CGL; (2)
in that respect, the exclusion was a "clarification" of existing coverage; and (3) limited coverage would continue to be afforded for a
pollution "accident."
Between insurers and regulators, the terms "accident" and
"classical accident" have always been used interchangeably to express a sudden and unexpected event. Correspondence between
the IRB and the Texas Insurance Department expressly advised
that the exclusion would apply "except when pollution results from
the classical accident."5 7 The insurance regulator who received
this letter readily grasped the concept:
On April 20, 1970, a manager for the Insurance Rating
Board, R.G. Foster, wrote a letter (attached) to me about the
IRB pollution exclusion. Mr. Foster, who I always regarded as
extremely intelligent, honest and forthright, advised that the exclusion would apply to all bodily injury or property damage arising from pollution "except when pollution results from the
classical accident."

The IRB did subsequently submit such a pollution exclusion, which excluded all pollution claims unless they arose out
of a "sudden and accidental" discharge. The accompanying IRB
"Explanation" stated that there would still be coverage for a pollution "accident." In 1970, I understood all of these terms ("sudden,"
"classicalaccident" and "accident") to mean the same thing. What was
requiredwas8 a quick or abrupt event, something identifiable in both time
5
and place.
all general liability insurance, the exclusion to except pollution caused
by injuries when the pollution results from the classical accidenL It was
agreed that coverage should be made available on an individual risk
buy-back basis.
See Appendix of Brief for Appellant at 1344, Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident
Ins. Co. of Am., 134 N.J. 1, 629 A.2d 831 (1993) (No. C-3956-85) (emphasis added).
Compare the above with the May 1970 Regulatory "Explanation,"which stated:
Coverage for pollution or contamination is not provided in most cases
under present policies because the damages can be said to be expected

or intended and thus are excluded by the definition of occurrence.
The above exclusion clarifies this situation so as to avoid any question of
intent. Coverage is continued for pollution or contamination caused
injuries when the pollution or contamination results from an accident
See Morton, 134 N.J. at 36, 629 A.2d 851 (emphasis added).
57

See letter from R.G. Foster (IRB) to Milton Troxell, [former Director General

Liability-Casualty Division, Texas Board of Insurance] (April 20, 1970) (on file with
authors).
58 Aft. of Milton S. Troxell 1 3, 4 (emphasis added).
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The Morton court's analysis of the term "accident," as used in the
IRB Explanation, is flawed. The "estoppel" argument required adoption of the premise that use of that term would not have advised insurance regulators of any temporal limitation imposed by the exclusion.
Thus, the court attacked the IRB's use of "accident" in the Explanation
as misleading.5 9 Morton generalized that "accident" was construed by
courts as encompassing gradual "ongoing" events,6 and assumed that
regulators in 1970 would have shared that understanding.
Morton's conclusion that the IRB Explanation misled regulators
about the meaning and effect of the 1970 exclusion appears to have
been heavily influenced by the statements of former superintendent
Stewart as quoted in a commentary.6" Mr. Stewart's conclusions are
directly refuted by a New York regulator who was actually involved in
the 1970 filing:
I understand that former Superintendent Stewart has testified to the effect that the carriers' rating bureaus did not communicate a temporal usage in this filing, and that regulators
were told they were only dealing with a clarification of the "occurrence" definition which caused no change at all in coverage.
He has apparently stated that a restrictive operation of the exclusion upon gradual pollution discharges in 1970 would have
resulted in a drastic reduction of coverage. These conclusions
are simply not true. It is hard for me to accept that he would
advocate these positions.
The way the exclusion temporally restricted coverage was
clearly communicated by the carriers' rating bureaus to regulators. There was no mystery at all in the language that was used.
We in the Department, and particularly in the Rating Bureau,
were not in the slightest bit misled by this filing. There is absolutely no basis in fact for former Superintendent Stewart to suggest, nor for anyone to conclude, that we were misled.6 2
Morton's analysis of the previous CGL change, in 1966, is inconsistent with its analysis of the 1970 exclusion. Morton relates that the
1966 CGL change from "caused by accident" to "occurrence" was recognized as being intended to "'broaden coverage by... avoiding the
implication that there was no coverage for a continuing condition as

59 Morton, 134 N.J. at
60 Id. at 31, 629 A.2d

39, 629 A.2d at 853.
at 849 (citing three cases and various commentaries as supportive of this proposition).
61 Id. at 4243, 629 A.2d at 855 (citation omitted). See supra notes 52, 53, 55 and
infra note 121 referring to this testimony.
62 Aff. of Henry L. Lauer 1 7, 8.
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distinguished from a sudden event.'" 62 The court cited opinions that
"confirm the uniform understanding of the broadened coverage afforded under the 1966 revision of the CGL policy."4 But while Morton recognized that a pre-1966 "accident" policy provided narrower
coverage than a 1966 "occurrence" policy, it disregarded the well-understood meaning of "accident" when it examined the 1970 IRB Explanation, in which it found the term "accident" to mean the same thing
as "occurrence." This inconsistent interpretation of how the term accident was understood underpinned the court's conclusion that the
IRB Explanation was misleading.
Insurance regulators during this time period reject the notion
that they were misled. They understood "accident" as a sudden
"boom" event. For example, the former Massachusetts Insurance
Commissioner states:
The IRB Explanation stated that coverage would still be
provided for an "accident." In 1970 I understood an "accident"
as an event which was identifiable in time and place. An "accident" was a "boom" event, like an explosion. The Explanation
was perfectly consistent with the exclusion's language. In essence, pollution coverage was returned to a "caused by accident"
basis in 1970.65

The former Insurance Commissioner of Tennessee concurs:
The wording of the exclusion was clear. "Sudden" did not
mean gradual. It meant quick or abrupt in a temporal sense.
The IRB Explanation was equally clear. Only a pollution "accident" would be covered. An "accident" was a sudden
event,
66
something identifiable at a specific time and place.
The former Florida Insurance Commissioner adds:
Prior to 1966, the general liability policy covered "accidents," which were "boom" events that occurred suddenly or abruptly. "Accidents" were fortuitous events identifiable in time
and place. The 1966 CGL "occurrence" policy broadened coverage to include gradual exposures as long as the damage was not
intended or expected. These meanings were a matter of com67
mon knowledge in the Insurance Department at the time.
Contemporaneous regulatory documents corroborate that state
insurance commissioners understood the insurance concept of a sud63 Morton, 134 N.J. at 32, 629 A.2d
INSURANCE LAw § 5.4c, at 300 (1971))
64
65

66
67

at 849 (quoting ROBERT KETON, BASIC
(emphasis added).

Id. at 32-33, 629 A.2d at 849 (citations omitted).
Aff. of C. Eugene Famam 1 3.
Aft. of Milton P. Rice 1 4.
Aff. of Broward Williams 1 3.

TEXT IN
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den "accident." The IRB's Explanatory Memorandum of Changes" forwarded which the 1966 CGL policy specifically informed regulators
that: "An 'occurrence', as defined, includes not only a sudden event
identifiable in time which is characterized as an 'accident', but also
exposures to conditions which may continue for days, weeks, months
or even years."69
In November 1971, a similar regulatory explanation accompanied
what became known as the 1973 CGL policy. That 1971 Explanatory
"accident"
Memorandum of Changes70 also informed regulators that7 an
1
place."
and
time
to
as
boom)
(a
"suddenness
required
These 1966 and 1971 regulatory explanations were before the
Morton court. They demonstrated that "accident" meant a "boom"
event or a "classical accident" to regulators and insurers in 1966 and
1971. There was no basis for the court to conclude that "accident"
would have been understood to mean something else in 1970.
Although "accident" had been interpreted by a few courts (as a
policy term) to include gradual damages, 72 the regulatory estoppel issue raised in Morton involves what insurers meant to convey in insurance parlance to insurance regulators. In 1970, both insurers and
understood how the explanatory materials used the term
regulators 73
"accident."
As stated by the former Insurance Commissioner of
South Carolina:
Consistent with the "sudden" language of the exclusion, the
IRB "Explanation" forthrightly stated there would be continued
pollution coverage for an "accident." In 1970, "accident" was
recognized as describing a "boom" event, a catastrophic happen68 See Appendix of Brief for Amicus Curiae State of New Jersey at 34-42, Morton
Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 134 N.J. 1, 629 A.2d 831 (1993) (No. C3956-85).
69 Id. at 38.
70 Appendix of Brief for Appellant at 1710, Morton (No. C-3956-85).
71 Id.
72 Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 134 N.J. 1, 31-32, 629
A.2d 831, 849 (1993). Even assuming courts in some states denied "accident" its temporal element prior to 1970, that was not the case in New Jersey. See Liondale Beach,
Dye & Paint Works v. Riker, 85 N.J.L. 426, 429, 89 A. 929, 931 (1914) ("where no
specific time or occasion can be fixed upon as the time when the alleged accident
happened, there is no 'injury by accident'"); Ptak v. General Elec. Co., 13 N.J. Super.
294, 300, 80 A.2d 337, 340 (Essex County Ct.), af'd, 16 N.J. Super. 573, 85 A.2d 214
(App. Div. 1951) (an accident is "an event happening at a specific time or occasion")
(citing Dawson v. E.J. Brooks, 134 N.J.L. 94 (Sup. Ct. 1946)). The Oklahoma
Supreme Court has also given the term "accident" a temporal treatment. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Briscoe, 239 P.2d 754, 758 (Okla. 1951).
73 In insurance parlance, "accident" still retains its traditional temporal element.
See Rupp's INSURANCE RisK & MANAGEMENT GLOSSARY 3, 4 (1991) (temporal "accident"
is distinguished from "accidental occurrence").
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ing which was identifiable in time and place. Even though some
courts may have seen fit to stretch the interpretationof the policy term
"accident" to include gradual exposures prior to 1970, that would not
have affected insurance bureaus' and insurance regulators' longstanding usage and understandingof that term. The pollution exclusion,
then, returned ?ollution coverage back to a pre-1966 "caused by
accident" basis.
The 1970 pollution exclusion completed a pollution coverage "cycle." Under pre-1966 "accident" policies, coverage was intended only
for sudden "boom" events. The 1966 CGL "occurrence" policy included coverage for both traditional "accidents" and certain gradual,
but fortuitous, damage. Independent legal commentators have recognized that the 1970 pollution exclusion returned pollution coverage
to the traditional, pre-1966 "accident" basis. 75 This cycle of coverage
was recognized by the former insurance regulators. The former Massachusetts Insurance Commissioner states: "In essence, pollution coverage was returned to a 'caused by accident' basis in 1970. " 76 The
former Idaho Commissioner of Insurance adds: "Thus, in 1970, I
knew the pollution exclusion excluded coverage for gradual pollution
discharges. It did so by returning pollution coverage to the old sud77
den 'accident' basis."
As Morton found, the plain language of the 1970 exclusion was
clear and unambiguous. Contrary to Morton's conclusion, the 1970
regulators were able to and did understand exactly what the exclusion
meant and how it affected the scope of coverage. The testimony of
New Jersey regulator Steen, not before the court because of the lack
of an evidentiary hearing, demonstrates the court's misunderstanding.
Steen was fully aware that the pollution exclusion could restrict coverage even though "in most cases," pollution claims arising at the time
were already barred by the occurrence definition:
In 1970, I understood "sudden" to mean "quick" in a temporal sense. I understood that, under certain circumstances,
the "sudden" language of the exclusion would restrict coverage
Aff. of John W. Lindsay 1 7 (emphasis added).
75 See Dan R. Anderson, What Role Will the InsuranceIndusty Play in the Fight Against
Pollution?,25 CPCU AnNA.s 23, 27 (March 1972) ("The presence of the exclusion has
74

the effect of converting that portion of the liability policy from a 'per occurrence' to a
'per accident' basis. This was accomplished by including the phrase 'sudden and accidental.'"); Holmes, supra note 27, at 395-96 ("Perhaps this exclusion does nothing
more than revert to the former 'caused by accident' coverage."); S.S. HUEBNER ET AL.,
PROPERTY AND LLAiLrIy INSURANCE 434, 443 (2d ed. 1976) ("The effect, as far as the
named peril [of pollution] is concerned, is to revert to an 'accident' basis.").
76 Aff. of C. Eugene Farnam 1 3.
77 Aft. of John R Blaine 1 5.
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as well as clarify the insurance contract with respect to the insurance industry's perception in 1970 that most gradual pollution
discharge claims were already precluded by "occurrence"
language.78
Steen also understood that the "accident" which would trigger the exception to the exclusion was not a gradual process, but a sudden event
identifiable in time:
I was a general liability analyst in 1966 when "occurrence"
coverage was introduced on a standard basis. I understood the
difference between the terms "occurrence" and "accident." The
earlier "accident" coverage related to a fortuitous event identifiable in time, an event which was both sudden/abrupt and unexpected. "Occurrence" expanded the basis of coverage to
include79claims for damages arising out of multiple or gradual
events.

Steen concluded:
As my April 20, 1970 memorandum reflects, I was aware
that, as a result of the proposed pollution exclusion, it was possible that the costs of excluded environmental damage could fall
on the State or other governmental agency when a policyholder,
not otherwise insured by other specific insurance instruments,
was not in a financial position to pay for such loss.
Whatever prospective [sic] twenty plus years after the fact
might bring to consideration of the Department's actions in
1970, the Department invested considerable effort and time in
evaluating the subject exclusions. The Department was not igor
norant, inept, indifferent to ethical and statutory obligations,
80
misled in making its determination in this matter.
If the Morton court had allowed an evidentiary hearing, Mr. Steen
would have made clear that the policyholders' accusations about New
Jersey's approval of the exclusion were specious.
VI.

THE TREATMENT OF REGULATORY HISTORY IN OTHER COURTS

Morton discounts decisions which enforced pollution exclusions, stating that those courts did not consider regulatory history.81 Morton assumes that those courts were unaware of it and of
the insureds' regulatory history arguments.
78

Aff. of Jerome Steen

79 Id.
80 Id.
81

7.

2.

11 14, 15.
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 134 N.J. 1, 47, 55, 629

A.2d 831, 857-58, 862 (1993).
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In Hybud Equipment Corp. v. Sphere Drake Insurance Co.,8 2 five
separate amici curiae briefs made extensive "regulatory history" arguments to the Ohio Supreme Court. Hybuds unanimous decision
applying the pollution exclusion as written suggests that the policyholder arguments were found to be unpersuasive. Similarly, in
Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co."3 and in Polaroid Corp. v.
Travelers Indemnity Co., 4 the regulatory history arguments were

presented to the Supreme Courts of Michigan and Massachusetts.
As in Hybud, the holdings applying the pollution exclusion demonstrate the rejection of the policyholders' regulatory history
argument.
Other courts, also aware of policyholders' historical arguments, have declined to follow them. 5 Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Laudick expressly declined to follow Morton since there

was "no suggestion of any deception" in the case before the Kansas
Court of Appeals."6
The Florida Supreme Court was one of the first courts to consider an insurer's arguments and evidence responding to insureds'

regulatory history theories.87 Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern
Fidelity Insurance Corp. (Dimmit II) denied gradual pollution cover-

age under the pollution exclusion. Morton essentially discounted
this reversal."'
Dimmitt I had described the policyholders' regulatory history
argument as the basis for its rejection of the pollution exclusion on
597 N.E.2d 1096 (Ohio 1992).
476 N.W.2d 392 (Mich. 1991).
84 610 N.E.2d 912 (Mass. 1993).
85 See Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Tonka Corp., No. 92-3187, 1993 WL 461825
(8th Cir. Nov. 12, 1993); Bureau of Engraving, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., No. 92-2910,
1993 WL 382626 (8th Cir. Oct. 1, 1993); United States Fidelity & Guar. v. Morrison
Grain, 999 F.2d 489 (10th Cir. 1993); Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 15
Cal. Rptr. 2d 815 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); ACL Technologies v. Northbrook Property and
Casualty Co., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 206 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Laudick, 859 P.2d 410 (Kans. Ct. App. 1993).
82
83

86 Farm Bureau, 859 P.2d at 414. See also affidavits of Kansas regulators, Raymond
E. Rathert, Larry K. Bryan, and Robert D. Hayes, which now support that court's
conclusions.
87 Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Corp., No. 78293, slip op.
(Fla. Sept. 3, 1992) ("Dimmitt I"), rev'd on reh'g No. 78293, 1993 WL 241520 (Fla. July
1, 1993) ("Dimmitt I"), reh'g pending. See a detailed presentation of the evolution of
the "history" debate in BernardJ. Daenzer and Edward Zampino, EnvironmentalLiability and the Pollution Exclusion: Why Some Courts Find Coverage,46 CPCUJ. 2 (June 1993).
The authors of this article advance the positions of insurers in environmental insurance litigation.
88 Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 134 N.J. 1, 52 n.1, 629
A.2d 831, 860 n.1 (1993).
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the ground of ambiguity. As the New Jersey Supreme Court had in
Morton, the Florida Supreme Court in Dimmitt I came to the "inescapable conclusion" that the exclusion did not restrict coverage in
the manner insurers claimed it did.8 9 Dimmitt I, however, was decided without hearing the insurer's response to the regulatory history theory. This response was presented in the insurer's Motion
for Rehearing. The insurer demonstrated that in Dimmitt I, the historical evidence had been inaccurately represented by the policyholder and its amici curiae. That convinced Justice Grimes that in
Dimmitt I, he had "relied too much upon what was said to be the
drafting history of the pollution exclusion clause.. . -90 The policyholder "history" arguments that were the centerpiece of Dimmitt I
were rejected in Dimmitt II on further reflection in light of the
fuller historical evidence.
While eschewing Dimmitt II, Morton relies heavily upon the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Just v. Land Reclamation,
Ltd..91 Just also rendered its regulatory history-based broad interpretation of the exclusion without the benefit of an evidentiary
hearing. 9 2 As in Morton,Just accepted the conclusions set forth in
partisan journal articles asserting how regulators understood the
IRB filings.9 3 Had the Just court held an evidentiary hearing, it
could not have accepted those articles as evidence of the regulatory
approval process in Wisconsin.
In 1970, Stanley C. DuRose was Wisconsin Commissioner of
Insurance. Louis Hannes was his Chief in the Property Casualty
Rates Division. They have described their understanding of the
IRB filing. Mr. Hannes states: "I understand that there now exists
[sic] opinions that regulators were either misled by the IRB Explanation or that the significance of the filings was misunderstood.
This certainly was not the case in the Wisconsin Insurance
Department."9 4
Former Commissioner DuRose agrees:
89

See Dimmitt I, slip op. at 9 and 14.

90 See Dimmitt II, at *6 (Grimes, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

91 Morton, 134 N.J. at 66-68, 629 A.2d at 868-69 (citing Just v. Land Reclamation,
Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570 (Wisc. 1990)).
92

Independent legal commentary describes the result achieved by such broad ju-

dicial interpretation of the pollution exclusion which "include [s] the kinds of [grad-

ual] releases that insurers meant the pollution exclusion clause to exclude from
coverage." Developments in the Law, supranote 3, at 1582-83. One source has described

this "judicial strategy" as having "gutted the pollution exclusion clause." Id. at 1583.
93 Just v. Land Reclamation Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570, 574-75 (Wisc. 1990) (citations
omitted).

94

Aff. of Louis N. Hannes 1 6.
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I held weekly meetings with supervisory staff and had full
discussion of all regulatory and administrative matters in process. I would have been fully informed and cognizant of the
meaning and intent of all rate and policy form filings such as
listed in my Annual Report. Louis Hannes was experienced,
competent and qualified to assist me in processing and approving this filing.
...

The Insurance Rating Board's filing, which I recently

reviewed, was not misleading. 95
DuRose and Hannes had a firm grasp on how the terms in the
IRB Explanationwere used and understood, and how rates worked and
were developed in Wisconsin at that time. These concepts are
summed up by Mr. Hannes:
There is no question that the language was clearly understood at the time of approval. "Sudden and Accidental" coverage meant that the event took place quickly and at a precise
time, like an explosion, and not gradually over a period of time.
Since General Liability policies were usually written on an occurrence basis in 1970, I would have recognized the "pollution" exclusions as also clarifying intended restrictions on coverage.
The IRB Explanation is clear, and confirms my understanding.
There would not have been any request or requirement for
a rate adjustment when these exclusions were filed, as there was
little, if any, loss data at that time, and, as indicated in the IRB
Explanation, coverage was limited to true pollution accidents.
The "pollution" exclusions clarified what customarily was and
was not to be covered by a conventional General Liability Policy.
96
The restriction of coverage was not significant at that time.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, without these facts, erroneously hypothesized what DuRose and Hannes understood in 1970. That misconception was then relied on in Morton.9 7

Morton's reliance upon Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 9 8 and Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.?9 is similarly misplaced, because both cases also relied upon partisan commentaries for
facts, and neither case held an evidentiary hearing. The insurers in
those cases did not respond to the policyholders' regulatory argu-

ments. The 1992 affidavit of former West Virginia Insurance Commissioner Samuel Weese directly contradicts the Joy court's assumptions
Aft. of Stanley C. DuRose Jr. 1 6, 7.
Aff. of Louis N. Hannes
4, 5.
97 Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 134 NJ. 1, 67-68, 629
A.2d 831, 868-69 (1993) (citing Just 456 N.W.2d at 575).
98 421 S.E.2d 493 (W.Va. 1992).
99 380 S.E.2d 686 (Ga. 1989).
95
96
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of what Mr. Weese understood in 1970.100
VII.

THE POLICYHOLDER COMMUNITY'S OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE
COVERAGE EXPECTATIONS

The Morton court declared that a "typical commercial insured"
would have had "little, if any" awareness that the pollution exclusion changed the terms of CGL policy coverage.1 0 1 The court,
therefore, "imputed" its findings of the understanding of insurance
10 2
regulators to policyholders.
If the "typical commercial insured" in 1970 read its new standard pollution exclusion endorsement, the first item observed
would have been the statement that:
This endorsement modifies such coverage as is afforded by the
provisions of the policy relating to the following:
COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE
103

This "alert" was on every pollution exclusion endorsement filed during the 1970 regulatory approval process with all state insurance regulators. The endorsement's title alone-"Exclusion-Contamination
or Pollution"-was significant as it is widely held that exclusions subtract from the coverage grant of the insuring agreements. 104 Thus,
even an unsophisticated insured should have understood that the
scope of coverage was being affected.
The doctrine of objective reasonable expectations cannot be validly applied without evidence of the expectations of the insureds. Relevant evidence includes:
(a) Documents generated by sophisticated insurance brokers,
the agents for the policyholders, who negotiated and
procured policies on their behalf. Brokers' internal
records, newsletters, and seminar materials recognized the
restrictive aspect of the exclusion (in addition to its
clarification aspect), and the coverage "gap" the exclusion
100 Aff. of Samuel H. Weese

3. Mr. Weese submitted this affidavit after the Joy

Technologies court had rendered its decision. The carrier filed this affidavit with the
court in its rehearing motion. Among other reasons, the policyholder opposed the

filing on a timeliness basis. The order denying rehearing did so summarily without
addressing this affidavit.
101 Morton, 134 N.J. at 77, 629 A.2d at 874-75.
102 Id. at 78, 629 A.2d at 875. One of the reasons the court made this assumption
was because premiums were unchanged.
103 See, e.g., Appendix of Brief for Appellant at 1353, Morton (No. C-3956-85) (emphasis added).
104 See, e.g., Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 81 NJ. 233, 247, 405 A.2d 788, 795
(1979).
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advised their policyholder clients

accordingly.

(b)

The records of policyholder trade associations, including
those of frequent policyholder amici curiae filers, such as
the Chemical Manufacturers Association ("CMA"). Ten
years ago, the CMA admitted that the pollution exclusion
took away coverage for gradual pollution discharge claims.
One of the heads of CMA's specialized insurance
committee publicly criticized policyholders for filing
"frivolous" claims that "all" risk managers always knew
were not covered. 10 6 CMA now appears before courts
across the country, claiming that its members could not
understand0 7 this thoroughly "ambiguous" pollution
exclusion.'

(c)

(d)

Records of policyholder insurance associations comprised
of risk managers and insurance personnel, such as the Risk
and Insurance Management Society, Inc. (RIMS), which
demonstrate an understanding
and acceptance of the
08
exclusion's restrictive aspect.1
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
documents, including documents expressly recognizing
that CGL policies with a pollution exclusion did not afford
coverage for gradual pollution events. EPA documents

105 See Victor C. Harwood III et al., The Frivolity of Policyholder Gradual Pollution
DischargeClaims, 5 MEALEv's LmG. REP.: INs., #46, 25-29 (August 27, 1991).
106 See T.A. Caldwell, A Multinational'sEnvironmental Liability Problems, Irr'L INS.

REP. 9, 11-12 (Sept. 1986). Caldwell, who was and continues to be Director of
Corporate Insurance for the American Cyanamid Corporation, has written:
I think the underwriters have been grossly mistreated by the US
courts. Also, I believe that many insured [sic] submitted frivolous claims
at best to their insurers and the courts in the hope of finding coverage.
It was clearly not the intent of either party to the insurance contract to
cover many of these events which were not truly sudden and accidental
in nature.

Non-sudden or gradual pollution liability insurance took the
form of the Environmental Impairment Liability policy (EIL)....
...
Although a creative lawyer can exploit a lack of specificity in
policy wording and convince a judge that any doubt regarding intent
should be ruled in favour [sic] of the policy holder - "This doesn't
make the final outcome right."
Id. Caldwell's position on the CMA's insurance committee was identified by Thomas
D. Lewison, also a former member of that committee, in an interview with one of the
authors of this article.
107 See Harwood, supranote 105, at 30-32. See also discussion of CMA evidence in an
article of insurer counsel, Victor C. Harwood III, et al., The Emperor's Illusionist:
Policyholders Retreat From Pollution Exclusion Extrinsic Evidence (Part One), 6 MEALE:'s
LrrIG. RPe.: INS. #25, 17, 39-42 (May 5, 1992).
108 See Harwood, supra note 105, at 30-32; Harwood, supra note 107, at 35-37.
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describe abrupt spills or explosions as "sudden," in
contrast to "gradual" pollution events, which were longterm practices,
such as the discharging and burial of
109
wastes.
(e) Insurance trade publications recognizing both the
restrictive and clarification aspects of the exclusion over
the years. 1 10
(f) Evidence from individual insureds themselves adopting
the premise that only an Environmental Impairment
Liability (EIL) policy afforded coverage for gradual
pollution exposures. 1'
There was no basis to "impute" any understanding of insurance
regulators to policyholders when better evidence was readily available.
Morton expressly found that the pollution exclusion was plain and unambiguous." 2 Therefore, it is not surprising that insureds, their brokers, their insurance and trade associations, insurance trade
publication authors, and federal and state environmental agencies understood that it was not reasonable to expect gradual pollution coverage under CGL policies.
In reality, insurers, regulators, and insureds were all on the same
page. The carriers misrepresented nothing. The regulators misunderstood nothing. The policyholders' coverage expectations were in
accord. To impute a contrary expectation to policyholders only underscores the dangers inherent in ruling without the benefit of real
evidence.
VII.

DUE PROCESS AND EVIDENTIARY ISSUES

Even more disturbing than Morton's erroneous conclusions is
the judicial procedure employed to reach them. First, the court
employed a new theory-regulatory estoppel-on appeal. Second,
the court permitted that theory to be argued on the basis of "facts"
arising from partisan commentators' descriptions in lawjournal articles. Finally, the court failed to afford the opposing party the op109 See Harwood, supra note 105, at 34-37; Harwood, supra note 107, at 43-45.
Notably, CGL policies had to be specially endorsed to fulfill New Jersey's financial
responsibility regulations. See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 26-9 (1990).
110 See Harwood, supra note 105, at 32-34; Harwood, supra note 107, at 45-47.
111 See Harwood, supra note 105, at 29-30. See also Caldwell, supra note 106. In
addition, independent legal commentary describes the temporal "gradual" way an
EIL policy supplements the temporal sudden pollution coverage of the CGL policy.
See Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1577 ("To cover the gradual events
apparently excluded by the standard CGL, the environmental impairment liability
(EIL) policy was invented in the late 1970s.").
112 Morton, 134 N.J. at 28-30, 629 A.2d at 847-48.
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portunity to challenge the "evidence" through cross-examination.
Hearsay was not merely permitted, it was the exclusive evidence
before the court.
The Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution
and state constitutions, including New Jersey's, require that litigants be permitted to produce evidence in support of their positions and be provided with a hearing before significant remedies
can be invoked against them.
When a claim or defense emerges on appeal, if it is to be considered, a remand must be afforded to permit the opposing party
to develop and present evidence relevant to the new claim. Thus,
in Harrv. Allstate Insurance Co.,113 when a prima facie case of estoppel was made out on appeal against an insurer, the case was remanded to afford the insurer an opportunity to respond. In
contrast, Morton estopped insurers from relying upon the "literal
terms" of the pollution exclusion without affording them the opportunity to present a fully developed factual record to rebut the
matters raised on appeal and upon which the court relied.1 1 4 The
rationale given by the court was its conclusion that the partisan
commentaries it considered provided an "accurate and comprehensive basis" for its decision." 5
Saunders v. Shaw' 1 6 demonstrates the constitutional error committed in Morton. In Saunders, the United States Supreme Court
reversed a decision by the Louisiana Supreme Court which had denied a request for an evidentiary hearing on whether a parcel of
property was subject to a tax assessment. 7 Justice Holmes suggested that the state court's denial was based on its conclusion that
the legality of the assessment "was so plain on the uncontroverted
facts . . . that to remand [the case] would be an empty form-a
mere concession to technicality." 1 a8 The Justice highlighted the
constitutional infirmity in that reasoning: "It may turn out so, but
we do not see in the record an absolute warrantfor the assumption
and therefore cannot be sure that the defendant's rights are protected without giving him a chance to put his evidence in."' 19 The
54 N.J. 287, 255 A.2d 208 (1969).
Morton, 134 N.J. at 29, 629 A.2d at 848. See also Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 100
N.J. 325, 342 n.6, 495 A.2d 406, 416 n.6 (1985) (remanding a matter to hear further
arguments on the understanding of the parties, although the court asserted that if any
evidence existed, it would have already been in the record).
115 Morton, 134 N.J. at 29, 629 A.2d at 848.
116 244 U.S. 317 (1917).
117 Id. at 319.
113
114

Id.
119 Id. (emphasis added).
118
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Morton court's determination that it would be "redundant" to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing similarly violated the insurers' due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Morton's refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing on the regulatory history issues also deprived the insurers of the opportunity to
confront opposing witnesses and cross-examine them. These rights
are fundamental elements of judicial due process:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in
our jurisprudence.... We have formalized these protections in
the requirements of confrontation and cross-examination....
This court has been zealous to protect these rights from erosion.... It has spoken out not only in criminal cases, but also in
all types of cases where administrative and regulatory actions
were under scrutiny.12 °
The absence of cross-examination may have significantly influenced the Morton court, as it relied heavily on the reported statements
of one former state insurance regulator, Richard E. Stewart. 1 21 Reportedly, he had stated that insurers' internal drafting documents
were inconsistent with the regulatory filings. As noted, the Morton
court was unaware that Stewart had frequently worked as an "expert"
witness for policyholders in environmental insurance matters since
1985. One of the important functions of cross-examination is to identify potential bias, which can be missed when a court relies on
hearsay. 122
Cross-examination can also bring to light a witness's inconsistent
statements. Morton cited Stewart's testimony that the drafters intended to accomplish a serious cutback in coverage by restricting coverage "in a temporal sense." 123 Lacking a hearing and crossexamination, the court was unaware that, until he was confronted with
them, Stewart previously opined that drafting documents showed that
120 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959) (citations omitted); accord,
Ledenza v. A & C Drywell, 254 N.J. Super. 613, 618, 604 A.2d 169, 171 (App. Div.
1992).
121 Morton, 134 N.J. at 43, 629 A.2d at 855. See also supra notes 52, 53, 55, and 61
(referring to Mr. Stewart's testimony).
122 The article which cited the testimony the court relied upon failed to acknowledge Mr. Stewart's relationship with policyholders. In 1989 alone, Stewart was paid
$600,000 for his "expert" testimony on behalf of policyholders. See Stewart's deposition testimony in transcript of deposition at 27, Hatco Corp. v. W.L Grace & Co., No.
89-1031 (D.N.J. November 18, 1991).
123 Indeed, Stewart now admits that he has never seen a single document generated
by the exclusion's drafters where "sudden" was said to just mean "unexpected." See
Transcript of proceedings at 6173-74, Purex Indus. v. Leslie Walpole Proctor, No.
C446935 (Sup. CL Cal. Dec. 4, 1992).
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124
the exclusion "does not have a temporal component."

The opportunity for cross-examination would also have permitted
the insurers to adduce testimony in support of their position. In particular, Stewart has agreed with the proposition in the IRB Explanation
that, because of the occurrence definition, "in most cases" pollution
claims were not covered under the 1966 CGL. 1 25 This testimony is
inconsistent with the basic premise underlying Morton's conclusion
that the IRB Explanationwas misleading.
Stewart further accepts that there is no factual basis to conclude
that the amount of premiums charged has a direct bearing on the
amount of coverage provided because there are "a million and one"
reasons why a premium may or may not be charged. He has warned
against "work[ing] backwards" from premium data, as Morton did, to
ascertain the coverage provided by a policy. 126 Other statements by
Stewart similarly support
the insurers' position in Morton, but were un1 27
available to the court.

See Stewart's expert report submitted in J.T. Baker v. Aetna Casualty and Surety
Co., No. 86-4794SSB (D.NJ. Nov. 21, 1988) 1 11 ("These [drafting history and regulatory filings] documents establish that the 'sudden and accidental' language of that
exclusion does not have a temporal component.") (emphasis added).
125 In Purex Industries, Stewart deposed:
Q. Mr. Stewart, if one accepts your view of the occurrence definition and its impact on pollution claims, could one accept the statement
that was made to the West Virginia authorities that most pollution
claims are already excluded by the occurrence definition?
A. At the time the statement was made, I think you could accept
it, yes.
124

* . . I don't have any difficulty accepting that people believed that
the state of claims in their past experience was such that many of them
would have been knocked out or, in fact, maybe were being knocked
out by coverage defenses based on expected and intended.

...
But it does not, on the face of it, surprise me coming at the
time it did.
Transcript of Stewart's Deposition (March 4, 1992) at 292-94.
126 See Stewart deposition testimony in Celotex Corporation v. London Insurers,
(A.D.R. Proceeding, Aug. 21, 1990) at 76-77.
127 Stewart has testified that there were discussions of both the clarification and the
restrictive aspects of the pollution exclusion in the West Virginia filings. Rather than
characterizing it as misleading, Stewart found the filing, at worst, a "confused record."
See Stewart's deposition testimony in Hartford Accident & Indem. Corp. v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., No. 88C-10515 (D. Utah Mar. 20, 1990), at 309-10.
Moreover, Stewart rejected the "drafting presumption" argument. He agrees
that drafters cannot be "presumed" to have intended a non-temporal meaning for
"sudden and accidental," based upon a prior court interpretation of that language in
a boiler and machinery policy. See Stewart's deposition testimony in National Union
Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. BKK Corp., No. C637637 (Cal. Los Angeles Cty. Apr. 3,
1991), at 133. Stewart has stated that the drafters, Bruton and Schmalz, chose the
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The discussion here of Mr. Stewart is not intended to denigrate
him because he now provides expert testimony for policyholder-litigants. Rather, Stewart's various statements, both inconsistent with the
published material relied on by the court, and also those statements
supporting the insurers on other issues, were not available to the Morton court because there was no evidentiary hearing. By hearing and
adopting only a single, narrow statement by Stewart which appeared
in one article, the court lost the benefit of all of Stewart's potential
evidence, and the insurers lost the protections afforded by the rights
of confrontation and cross-examination.
Cross-examination is not the only office of an evidentiary hearing. A hearing affords litigants the opportunity to present evidence in
refutation of their opponents' evidence. For example, in an evidentiary hearing insurers could respond to Mr. Stewart's statements with
the testimony of a New York regulator who was actually involved in the
1970 proceedings, Henry Lauer."' s And where witnesses' testimony
and recollections collide, issues of credibility arise, which can only be
resolved by a trier of fact who can directly assess the witnesses and
their testimony.

129

Finally, the resort to law journal articles as an exclusive source of
factual evidence raises substantial concerns. The right to cross-examine is not absolute; hearsay exceptions have been developed over
the years to permit the use of hearsay evidence that has "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction
of the declarant.""' ° Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, even the
hearsay exception for learned treatises permits their use as evidence
only when presented in conjunction with an expert witness who is subject to cross-examination, and not as independent, self-authenticating
evidence.13 1 Moreover, law journal articles are not recognized as reliable authorities per se, like any other text their authority can only be
established through competent testimony that is subject to crossexamination.

13 2

Factual questions, especially disputed and dispositive ones,
exclusion's language so as to put the "occurrence genie" back in the bottle. See Stewart's deposition testimony in Smith v. Hughes Aircraft Co., No. 88-406-TUO-WDB (D.

Ariz. Apr. 23, 1991), at 446-47.
128 Mr. Lauer's testimony refutes Mr. Stewart on every point on which the Morton
court relies on Stewart. See Af. of Henry L. Lauer.
129 See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 495-96 (1951).
130 See FED. R. EvID. 803 advisory committee's note.
131 FED. R. EvID. 803(18); see also Generella v. Weinberger, 388 F. Supp. 1086, 108990 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (stating that it is improper to rely on medical treatises where no
opportunity to cross-examine as expert).
132

See Hemmingway v. Ochsner Clinic, 608 F.2d 1040, 1047 (5th Cir. 1979) (ex-
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should not be presumed by a court of last resort.'" 3 If the 1970 understanding of insurance regulators is as important as Morton has
deemed, it is equally important to ascertain what that understanding
actually was. Commentaries cannot substitute for evidence that has
been subjected to cross-examination without doing great violence to
fundamental principles of justice.
IX.

THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION AND "SocL

PREMISES"

In Dimmitt IJustice Grimes of the Florida Supreme Court candidly stated that in Dimmitt I he had "perhaps subconsciously [relied] upon a social premise that I would rather have insurance
companies cover these losses rather than parties ...

who did not

actually cause the pollution damage."' 3 4 This recognition helped
compel Justice Grimes to become part of the new Florida Supreme
Court majority finding the exclusion plain, unambiguous and
enforceable.
New Jersey probably has more contaminated sites than any
other state. Although the availability of additional funding for
their clean-up is an appealing social premise, insurance carriers'
rights require that such ends not be allowed to justify the means.
As Justice Grimes recognized, perhaps some courts have been
predisposed to the inaccurate policyholder "history" presentation
because of such social premises. Thus, far from being "redundant," an evidentiary hearing is absolutely necessary. No court in
the country has ever held such a hearing in any case. No social
premise, especially one fueled by unfounded accusations of pervasive fraud, should deprive litigants of a true day in court.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has historically been lauded as
one of the most progressive and fair-minded courts in the nation.
It has, at times, fashioned new remedies to ensure that the rights of
the litigants before it are vindicated. Both the court's refusal to
permit a full evidentiary hearing, and its holding, are unprecedented in NewJersey. Dimmitt I demonstrates, however, that a fairminded court can remedy its error. The "inescapable conclusion"
reached in Dimmitt Iwas indefensible in light of the full facts. The
vehemence of that ruling did not, however, prevent that court
from rectifying its grievous error in Dimmitt II.
cluding medical text where there was no testimony that the document was recognized
as reliable authority).
133 See, e.g., Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 100 N.J. 325, 342 n.6, 495 A.2d 406, 416 n.6

(1985).
134 Dimmitt II, supra note 87, slip op. at 14.
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The Morton court claims to manifest "no hostility to restrictive
coverage provisions" in insurance policies.13 5 Whether it will
demonstrate the sincerity of that resolve by re-examining or rejecting the regulatory fictions underlying its estoppel analysis is yet
to be seen. At least for now, it is the New Jersey Supreme Court
that has misapprehended the regulatory issues of 1970. The state
insurance regulators of 1970 did not.

135

Morlon, 134 N.J. at 78, 629 A.2d at 875.
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ADDENDUM
The following affidavits are included in the Addendum:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

20.

Blaine, John R., Former Insurance Commissioner of the State
of Idaho;
Bryan, Larry K, Former Kansas Fire and Casualty Policy
Examiner;
DuRose, Stanley C., Former Wisconsin Insurance
Commissioner;
Farnam, C. Eugene, Former Massachusetts Commissioner of
Insurance;
Hannes, Louis N., Former Wisconsin Deputy Insurance
Administrator;
Hayes, Robert D., Kansas regulatory staff member;
Lauer, Henry L., Chief of the Property & Casualty Division of
the New York Insurance Department;
Lindsay, John, Former South Carolina Commissioner of
Insurance;
Lombard, Edward P., Former District of Columbia Superintendent of Insurance;
O'Malley, Thomas L., Former Minnesota Assistant Insurance
Commissioner;
Omholt, Elmer V., Former Montana Insurance Commissioner;
Preston, Robert D., Former Kentucky Commissioner of
Insurance;
Rathert, Raymond E., Supervisor of the Fire and Casualty Division of the Kansas Department of Insurance;
Rice, Milton P., Former Tennessee Insurance Commissioner;
Ryan, Kevin, Former Illinois Deputy Director of the Property
and Liability Branch;
Steen,Jerome, Former Primary Rate Analyst of the NewJersey
Department of Insurance;
Summerhays, Melvin L., Former General Liability Rates and
Forms Analyst of the Utah Department of Insurance;
Troxell, Milton S., Former Director of the Texas Board of Insurance General Liability-Casualty Division;
Weese, Samuel, Former West Virginia Insurance Commissioner (Mr. Weese's affidavit was obtained prior to the rendering of the Morton opinion);
Williams, Broward, Former Florida Insurance Commissioner.
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The following additional affidavits are on file with the authors:
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Balfour, Edward H., Former Chief Property and Casualty Analyst of the Rhode Island Department of Insurance;
Barger, Richards D., Former Insurance Commissioner in the
State of California;
Barnes, J. Richard, Former Colorado Insurance Commissioner;
Briggs, Theodore T., Former Maine Insurance Commissioner;
DeGeeter, Jr., Frank, Former Delaware Deputy Commissioner
of Insurance;
Dirks, Warren E., Former South Dakota Insurance
Commissioner;
Erway, Donald, Former Deputy Director of the Nebraska Department of Insurance;
Forrester, Tharpe, Former Alabama Insurance Commissioner;
Harbolt, James, Former Oregon General Liability Rates and
Forms Analyst;
Hazelwood, Garland, Former Assistant Insurance Commissioner of Virginia;
Herrmann, Karl V., Former Washington State Insurance
Commissioner;
Higley, Robert M., Former Assistant General Liability Senior
Rate Analyst of the State of Washington Department of
Insurance;
Howatt, F. Frank, Former Deputy Commissioner of the Oregon Department of Insurance;
Jasso, Vincente B., Former New Mexico Superintendent of
Insurance;
Mastos, Louis T., Former Commissioner of the Nevada Department of Insurance;
McCue, Jr., William G., Former Florida Senior Rate Analyst;
Mullaney, Peter F., Former Rhode Island Commissioner;
Ovaitt, Frank E., Former Assistant Supervisor of the Missouri
Insurance Department;
Ritz, Oscar H., Former Indiana Insurance Commissioner;
Simpson, Richard W., Former Assistant Director of the Pennsylvania Insurance Department;
Timmons, William E., Former Insurance Commissioner of the
State of Iowa;
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42.
43.
44.
45.
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Tirey, Lucius, Former member of the Oklahoma State Board
for Property and Casualty Rates;
Van Hooser, Russell E., Former Michigan Insurance
Commissioner;
Walker, Hargis P., Former Executive Officer of the Louisiana
Casualty and Surety Rating Commission;
Walton, William G., Former Wyoming Insurance
Commissioner;

All affidavits were obtained by the authors of this article, with
the exception of Oklahoma (Tirey), which was obtained by Lord,
Bissell & Brook of Chicago, Illinois, and Huckaby, Fleming, Frailey,
Chaffin & Darrah of Chickasha, Oklahoma. Mudge, Rose, Guthrie,
Alexander & Ferdon of New York participated in obtaining affidavits of regulators in NewJersey (Steen) and Kansas (Rathert, Bryan
and Hayes).

1993]

FICTION OF REGULATORY ESTOPPEL
AFFIDAVIT

I, John R. Blaine, do depose as follows:
1. I have a long background in insurance. After working in an insurance agency and
the Idaho Surveying and Rating Bureau, I was special agent for the Hartford Insurance
Group for fourteen years. I then served as Insurance Commissioner of the State of
Idaho from 1967 to 1972. Thereafter I worked for several major brokerage firms. I
then managed my own insurance agency from 1976 to 1985. In 1979 I was involved
in the formation of a domestic reciprocal insurance company which wrote only
worker's compensation coverage for the Idaho logging industry. I am presently the
President and Chairman of the Board of the Attorney-In-Fact of this company known
as the Associated Loggers' Exchange.
2. I was careful to hire knowledgeable people who knew the insurance business. We
took pride in our responsibility to protect the insurance-consuming public as well as
treat the insurance industry fairly, which also enures to the benefit of the consumer.
I know that we studied proposed filings with these thoughts in mind. We were very
concerned with the cost of insurance and we did not want to disrupt insurance
markets.
3. I do recall generally the Insurance Rating Board's (IRB) "sudden and accidental"
pollution exclusion filing and the Exotanation submitted with it. I have also recently
reviewed those materials which refresh my recollection of them.
4. I can state that I understood these IRB documents in 1970 in accordance with long
established word meanings commonly held in insurance circles and within our
department. "Sudden" was "abrupt/quick/fast." "Accident" was the way insurance
used to be written before the change to "occurrence."
An "accident" was a
fortuitous and sudden event. "Occurrence" policies expanded coverage to insure
accidents plus gradual unexpected damage. Further, "sudden and accidental"
described an "accident."
5. Thus, in 1970, I knew that the pollution exclusion excluded coverage for gradual
pollution discharges. It did so by returning pollution coverage to the old sudden
.accident" basis. The Exolanation specifically said su by continuing coverage for an
"accident." The exclusion itself said the same thing by covering only "sudden and
accidental" pollution discharges.
6. There was absolutely no mystery in the language used in the pollution exclusion
and the Exolanation. The IRB used words we regulators were all familiar with. I
certainly was not misled by this filing. There is no basis in fact for anyone to think
I was misled.
7.

In those days I never thought regular business pollution was covered but was a
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cost of doing business. Repetitive practices would almost always cause expected
damage. That is probably why there were so few pollution claims. I was not
surprised to see the first part of the Explanation express the same thought. By now
excluding coverage for gradual pollution discharges, the pollution exclusion certainly
clarified and emphasized that regular business pollution would not be covered. Even
though they operated differently, the results to be achieved by the occurrence
definition and the pollution exclusion were pretty much the same.
8. There was no way to rate the pollution exposure at that time. Loss experience
was scarce. Thus a reduction in premium was not indicated.
9. Any gradual pollution discharges which were not expected were also excluded from coverage
by the pollution exclusion. Such a claim would be random at best. The present environmental
liabilities recently created by statutes were not around at that time. The restrictive way the
exclusion accomplished its purpose was not viewed in 1970 as causing any kind of real reduction
in coverage.
10. I was confident at the time, and remain so today, that we fulfilled our public trust in
approving the pollution exclusion. The cost of insurance was kept in line for most consumers
without upsetting the insurance and reinsurance markets.

R. BLAINE

Subsmled and swan to

before me, tis /day of Septembr, 1993.

Notary Pubfi
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I, LARRY K. BRYAN, on my oath, depose and say:
1.

I

have

been

Insurance since July 22,

employed

by

the

Kansas

Department

of

1963 as a policy examiner for the Fire &

Casualty Section.
2.

I have a very limited recollection of the 1970 filing of

the "sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion by the Insurance
Rating

Board.

A

review

of

the

file

shows

that

I

had

some

involvement in the process.
3.

I have read the September 30, 1993 Affidavit of Raymond

E. Rathert.

Based on my review, knowledge and recollection, the

contents of that Affidavit are accurate.

-

Sworn and subscribeS to
before me this ,jfday
of

,

1993.

Larry K.' Bfyan
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AFFIDAVIT

I, Stanley C. DuRose, Jr., do depose as follows:
I.
I have been informed that the New Jersey Supreme Court has issued a decision which
involves an interpretation of a liability insurance contract containing an insuring agreement
exclusion for release of pollutants that is not sudden or accidental. It is my understanding that
the decision in part is based on a belief by the court that state insurance regulatory officials at
the time of the filing and approval of such contract language in 1970 were misled by insurance
bureaus and did not understand the scope and meaning of the coverage to be afforded under that
exclusion.
2.
The University of Wisconsin - Madison granted me a Bachelor of Science Degree in
Mechanical Engineering in June, 1948. 1 commenced employment with the State of Wisconsin
Office of the Commissioner of Insurance as a trainee property insurance rate and form analyst
on July 1, 1948. Except for 17 months in 1951-52 when I was recalled to the Air Force, I
worked on property rates and forms until 1955. In 1955, I transferred to the Casualty Insurance
Rates and Forms unit. In 1956, 1 was placed in charge of all casualty rate and form filings.
In 1961, 1 was named Assistant Deputy Commissioner with general responsibility for Office
operations and administration. In 1965, 1 was appointed Deputy Commissioner of Insurance.
All of these positions were under the Civil Service competitive examination system. In 1969,
the then-Governor appointed me Commissioner of Insurance. I served as Commissioner under
the subsequent Governor until 1975, at which time I reverted back to my civil service position
as Deputy Commissioner for approximately two years.
3.
In 1958, 1 was accepted as an Associate member of the Casualty Actuarial Society. In
1966, 1 was accepted as a member of the American Academy of Actuaries. I currently have a
retired status in both societies.
4.
In 1970, 1 was Vice Chairman of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners'
(NAIC) Property and Liability Committee. I was also a member of the Laws and Legislation
Committee and a member of some 20 subcommittees of the NAIC.
5.
1 have attached an excerpt of the 102nd Annual Report of the Wisconsin Commissioner
of Insurance. It contains a summary of the significant General Liability and other Casualty
insurance filings made in 1970, prepared by Louis N. Hannes, Chief, Property-Casualty Rates
Division. It states that the IRB and the MIRB amended rules in their manuals and filed forms
to exclude coverage arising out of contamination or pollution. The IRB filing was effective June
10, 1970 and the MIRB filing was effective July 29, 1970.
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6.
1 have no clear recollection of specific discussions I may have had with my staff, other
Insurance Commissioners or insurance industry representatives before or at the time of the
filings identified in paragraph 5 above. I do not think that the Wisconsin Records Center and
Archives would have retained any internal memorandul to me on the subject of the filed
pollution exclusion. However, I held weekly meetings with supervisory staff and had full
discussion of all regulatory and administrative matters in process. I would have been fully
informed and cognizant of the meaning and intent of all rate and policy form filings such as
listed in my Annual Report. Louis Hannes was experienced, competent and qualified to assist
me in processing and approving this filing. I am also confident that I was directly involved in
the approval several years earlier of policy forms wherein coverage was to be provided on an
occurrence basis as opposed to the traditional accident basis.
7.
In 1970, we would have understood "sudden" in terms of a happening that was
precipitous or abrupt. It did not mean "gradual." We understood what a sudden "accident"
was, and how it was different from an occurrence. The Insurance Rating Board's filing, which
I recently reviewed, was not misleading. Moreover, pollution claims had not been filed with
frequency at the time of the filing, and it would not have been logical to reduce premiums for
an exposure that could not be rated because of inadequate loss data.
8.
In reflecting oil approval of the pollution exclusion contract language in 1970, it occurs
to me that an attempt to disapprove would have also raised the question in ily mind concerning
the public policy of the State. During my service in the Office of the Commissioner I was
sensitive to the public policy issue of whether it would be appropriate to approve insurance
contracts that would provide coverage to miteinsured (as opposed to third parties) for intentional
and probably illegal acts of the insured. The question would have been whether the disapproval
of the filing would have mandated pollution coverage, which in turn would have encouraged
policyholders to take the risk of polluting because the costs of such pollution would be spread
among all such policyholders.
9.
In addition to the above, it has been my experience that the regulation of insurance and
the administration of state law is not conducted in isolation or a vacuum. There are a great
many competing segments and facets of tie insurance industry. Also there are, and have been,
multiple consumer organizations and active members of the legislative and executive branches
of government. Further, there has always been an extensive and active trade press which
contains detailed analysis and commentary oil specific filings, industry problems and significant
court decisions relevant to tile industry and its regulation. There were also a number of detailed
information resource publications such as the Fire, Casualty and Surety Bulletins, which
contained up-to-date analysis of contract language and its rationale, etc.
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10.
I have great respect for the judges and courts of the United States. However, if my
understanding of the decision as outlined in paragraph 1 is correct, then I must conclude that the
court was either misled or did not understand the day to day workings of the state regulatory
process, the level of interaction with the insurance industry and the trade press, and the use of
available technical publications available at that time.

YMOROS.EuKN~, JR.

Subscribed and sworn to
before me, this
day of QtM;
. , 1993.
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AFFIDAVIT

I, C. Eugene Farnam, do depose as follows:
I.
Iwas Insurance Commissioner in the State of Massachusetts from 1962 to 1972.
I generally recall the "sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion filed by the insurance
bureaus in approximately 1970. My recollection is refreshed by a recent reading of the
exclusion's language and the Explanation submitted to state insurance regulators by the
Insurance Rating Board.
2.
It goes without saying that in 1970 I understood the policy term "sudden" as
describing a temporal event. It meant "quick" /"abrupt." It could not include processes
or happenings that occurred gradually or incrementally over time.
3.
The IRB Explanation stated that coverage would still be provided for an
.accident." In 1970 1 understood an "accident" as an event which was identifiable in time
and place. An "accident" was a "boom" event, like an explosion. The Explanation was
perfectly consistent with the exclusion's language. In essence, pollution coverage was
returned to a "caused by accident" basis in 1970.
4.
The Explanation was also correct in stating in 1970 that "in most cases" pollution
claims would not be covered under the occurrence definition, which precluded claims for
damage that was expected or intended. It was understood in 1970 that there was
generally no pollution coverage under the 1966 CGL occurrence policy. Pollution
damage generated in the normal course of an insured's business operations would, or
should, be expected. It was a cost of doing business and not an insurable risk.
5.
In this context, the pollution exclusion certainly did clarify the coverage situation
in 1970. The restriction inherent in the exclusion's language, and confirmed in the
Explanation, was obvious. The exclusion was not, however, considered as significantly
reducing whatever pollution coverage existed in 1970.
6.
The explanatory materials submitted in 1970 to the department were not
misleading. Both the exclusion's plain language and the IRB Explanation said the same
thing. There would be no coverage for ongoing or continuous pollution discharges, even
if the discharges were unexpected. A claim would have to arise out of a pollution event
that was both sudden and accidental.

164878
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7.
The lack of a premium reduction when the exclusion was approved did not mean
the exclusion's restrictive effect was not understood in my department. Pollution claims
were quite rare in 1970. This was many years before the age of Superfund. There was
no way to rate the exposure at that time. Premiums would have been adjusted
prospectively as loss data was compiled.

C.EUG
.,OTAR

FRNM

PUBLIC

Sworn tb before me this
J, Vft- day of September 1993

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

Plymouth, ss

September 24, 1993

Then personally appeared before me, the above named C. Eugene
Farnam and declared to me that the material contained herein
is the truth to the best of his memory.

Williaim M. Leonard, Notary Public
My commission expires:
April 29, 1994
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AFFIDAVIT
I, Louis N. Hannes, do depose as follows:
1. 1 was employed by the State of Wisconsin Insurance Department from
November, 1961 through March, 1978. 1 started as a Property and Casualty
Rate and Form Analyst, and in 1971, 1 was named Administrator of the
Property and Casualty Rates and Forms Division. I currently am the
President of the Wisconsin Compensation Rating Bureau, a licensed rate
service organization for worker's compensation insurance in Wisconsin.
2. My responsibilities as an Analyst included General Liability, Worker's
Compensation, Burglary, Glass, Surplus Lines and Unauthorized Insurance.
I also worked on Automobile and other casualty coverages as a back-up.
When I became Administrator, I was responsible for all lines of Property
and Casualty Insurance.
3. While I do not actually recall the "pollution exclusion" filing in 1970,
the filing would have been approved by me as it was considered a General
Liability filing. Our procedure at that time was for the Analyst
responsible to review and either approve or disapprove the filing, and to
routinely advise the supervisor and others in the Department, including
the Commissioner.
4. 1 have recently reviewed the pollution exclusion language and the
Explanation submitted by the IRB. There is no question that the language
was clearly understood at the time of approval. "Sudden and Accidental"
coverage meant that the event took place quickly and at a precise time,
like an explosion, and not gradually over a period of time. Since General
Liability policies were usually written on an occurrence basis in 1970, I
would have recognized the "pollution" exclusions as also clarifying
intended restrictions on coverage. The IRB Explanation is clear, and
confirms my understanding.
5. There would not have been any request or requirement for a rate adjustment
when these exclusions were filed, as there was little, if any, loss data
at that time, and, as indicated in the IRB Explanation, coverage was
limited to true pollution accidents. The "pollution" exclusions clarified
what customarily was and was not to be covered by a conventional General
Liability Policy. The restriction of coverage was not significant at that
time.
6. 1 understand that there now exists opinions that regulators were either
misled by the IRB Explanation or that the significance of the filings was
misunderstood. This certainly was not the case in the Wisconsin Insurance
Department.

Louis N. Hannes'

Subscribed
before me, t
day of Sept

NOT

PU

Q
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AFFIDAVIT
I, ROBERT D. HAYES, on my oath, depose and say:
1.

I

have

been

employed

Insurance since February 1972.

by

the

Kansas

Department

of

Currently, I am the Supervisor of

the Professional Liability Section.
2.

I was not employed by the Department when the Insurance

Rating Board filed the "sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion
for use on comprehensive general liability policies; however, I was
involved with the regulatory approval process as it pertained to
the Farmers Comprehensive Personal Insurance Policy.
3.

As such, I am familiar with the materials submitted with

the exclusions both in 1970 and 1973.
4.

I have read

and reviewed the Affidavit of Raymond E.

Rathert dated September 30, 1993, and find it accurate to the best
of my knowledge and recollection.

Robert D. Hayes
Sworn and subscribed to
before me this
day
of_,
1993.
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AFEIDAVIT

i. HENRY L. LAUER. d depose as tll ws
I. I oined the New York !nsuiance Department ("the Deparment") in 1957. In 1962 I became
a Senior Insurance Examinci of the Rating Bureau. In 1981 I was promoted to Chief of the
Property and Casualty Division. I continue in that capacity today. In 1970, in addition to other
duties, I v.%is responsible, along with others in our Rating Bureau, for approving general liability
form filings tor the Department. We processed form filings under the supervision of our
superior.s in the Ratng Bureau.
2. In 1970 we had quite a large department of professional career insurance regulators. We
were part of Zone I, which included New Jersey, Maine and others. We examined filings of
insurance carriers and their rating bureaus very carefully to make certain they complied with the
pr(,isikons of Section 2307 of the Insurance Law. That law required that forms not be
misleading nor be in violation of public polity, We frequently discussed filings with insurance
regulators in other Zone I states.
3. During my career ot ovei thirty-five years with the Department I have served under many
Superintendents and Deputy Superintendents. Thv were generally not involved in the day-to-day
operations otf the approval process of filings. However, the degree of their involvement varied
with the ind;vidual. During the time that he was Superintendent ot the Department. Richard E.
Stewart. to the best ot my recollection, never participated in the decision making discussions
which led to approval or rejection of torm filings. In tact all such approvals were signed in his
name. usually by one of the Insurance Examiners.

4. Throughout my career the meaning of certain words has been basic to liability insurance.
When I joined the Department liability policies were written on a "caused by accident" basis.
An "accident" was a "boom" event, one which occurred quickly. It was a "sudden" happening
in the temporal abrupt sense. "Sudden was always understood as the opposite of "gradual."
"Sudden and accidental" was another way of describing an event which was an "accident." In
1966 the carriers' rating bureaus filed the "occurrence" general liability p)licy which temporally
expanded standard coverage. It insured not only the sudden accident but also gradual damage.
I know that these word usages were part of common, every-day speech, not only within the
Department's Rating Bureau, but also among the general liability regulators of the other
departments within Zone I.
5. I recall the "sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion which the carriers' rating bureaus
submitted fIor approval in 1970. I easily recognized that it excluded coverage for gradual
pollution discharges by excepting coverage for the old "boom" pollution accident which it
identified as "sudden and accidental."
I observed that for non-pollution situations the policy
continued to insure gradual damage on an "occurrence" basis.
6. The Explanation submitted with the exclusion confirmed that coverage for pollution damage
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was continued only for a pollution "accident." That was about the only real basis for pollution
coverage under "occurrence" policies anyway. I was not surprised to see the Explanation state
that "most cases" of pollution caused expected or intended damage. In those days virtually all
pollution damage was caused by regular business pollution discharges, and pollution coverage
claims were few. I agreed with the Explanation that this situation of general lack of
.occurrence" pollution coverage was clarified by eliminating coverage for gradual pollution
discharges. Obviously when you stop covering damage caused by gradual pollution discharges,
you also stop coverage for the expected damage which, "in most cases," those gradual discharges
are causing.
7. I understand that former Superintendent Stewart has testified to the effect that the carriers'
rating bureaus did not communicate a temporal usage in this filing, and that regulators were told
they were only dealing with a clarification of the "occurrence" definition which caused no change
at all in coverage. He has apparently stated that a restrictive operation of the exclusion upon
gradual pollution discharges in 1970 would have resulted in a drastic reduction of coverage.
These conclusions are simply not true. It is hard for me to accept that he would advocate these
positions.
8. The way the exclusion temporally restricted coverage was clearly communicated by the
carriers' rating bureaus to regulators. There was no mystery at all in the language that was used.
We in the Department, and particularly in the Rating Bureau, were not in the slightest bit misled
by this filing. There is absolutely no basis in fact for former Superintendent Stewart to suggest,
nor for anyone to conclude, that we were misled.
9. Although we did not view this exclusion as working a significant reduction in the limited
amount of realistic pollution coverage then available under occurrence policies, we did clearly
recognize that the exclusion would take away coverage for any gradual pollution discharges
which were truly unexpected. At that time any such liability was very rare since today's vast
array of Superfund liabilities did not exist. Nevertheless, because it was possible that some
gradual but unexpected losses had accrued under existing liability policies we refused to permit
the exclusion to be attached to existing policies as the carriers' rating bureaus had proposed. We
granted our approval tar its use only on new and renewal policies. Our approval on that basis
clearly signals our perception of this filing as causing a reduction of coverage in some cases.
10. I recall that back around 1970 New York was an "file and use" state. The carriers' rating
bureaus suggested advisory rates, and competition in the marketplace would govern rates.
Moreover, insurance departments would not have required premium reductions for exclusions,
such as the pollution exclusion, where there was no indication of change in loss data.
1I. We thought at the time that our approval of the exclusion for prospective application was
in accord with Section 2307 of the Insurance Law. We felt the exclusion was not unfairly
discriminatory nor in violation of public policy. We thought it would help contain the cost of
insurance as well as discourage pollution activities. Our public policy perceptions were soon
validated. In 1971 the State of New York enacted the "sudden and accidental" pollution
exclusion into law. That made it illegal to insure damage caused by gradual pollution discharges.
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12. I understand it has been suggested that the Legislatur: understood that this law would
preclude coverage only for active (ieckless and intentional) pdltiters. lhat was ine object
accomplished by the statute However. I know and recall that -Ac in the !),.partment clearly
recognized that the new law operated the same restrictive way as did the polhtiuin coclusion the
carriers' rating bureaus had previously submitted. Our Department dratted this hill which the
Governor subsequently, and successfully. sponsored. It clarified that coserage for rc-u!at
pollution damages would not be available because coveragc to! a1 gradkial pollutiom discharj;es.
even if unexpected, was prohibited. rhat clarili. atin was ;iccomplished by permittinj.,sera e
to be written only for temporally sudden pollution accidcnts it des .ribc'd a-. "sudden and
accidental." Of course, the statute did not aflct the Iegahi., il non-polluiin iasurance to
hisis.
continue to be written for gradual damages on an "occurren.c
13. Because ot the requirements ot the "sudlen and i,.i,Jcntal" polluti:m satutc it ssas nc'Usar\
for a gradual pollution exclusion to he attatLhd to tih._cI arm -r,, (', mpr,hcnsjie Pcis ial
Insurance Polic\.
1he carri,rs' rating bureau ,uhria!ted lh , "tandard torm ",iudin and
accidental" pollution exclusimon r ocmpliacc t, ibh thc statute I
,hat
htpprtcdIhn. , \u,t
II. 1971 when I was Senioi Insurance ILamiTI_ ()I thl. Ratin.F. [urciu.

HENRY L.

Subscribed and sworn to

before me, tliis.,:

day

of October, 1993.

Notary Public
Id
ELiE A. BEAGER
ubi.
Noaz3Siote 0i N-. Yolk
tkulfied in Nisaol County
Commlnr
Janury 31. l9..
0 Eopirell

UE
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AFFIDAVIT
I, John W. Lindsay, do depose as follows:
I.
I was the South Carolina State Insurance Commissioner from March 1970 to 1972. 1
returned to the department, again as Insurance Commissioner, from 1975 to 1981. From 1955
to 1970, I actively observed regulatory matters that came before the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners.
2.
Going back to 1970, the filing of then-new pollution exclusions was not a matter of
earthshaking consequence. Pollution coverage issues were essentially non-issues. This was so
because, even under tihe 1966 CGL "occurrence" policy, there was generally no coverage
intended or provided for pollution.
3.
Contamination damage resulting from the routine and normal operations of an insured
was not a covered occurrence. Damage resulting from repetitive business practices was a cost
of doing business and not insurable. I have recently reviewed the "Explanation" submitted by
the Insurance Rating Board to state insurance regulators in 1970. It quite appropriately stated
that, since "in most cases" pollution claims were already precluded by the occurrence definition,
the exclusion clarified the lack of existing pollution coverage at that time.
4.
It should not be forgotten that 1970 was years before the era of Superfund. The many
liabilities created by statutes like RCRA and CERCLA simply didn't exist. To impose a
modern-day perspective on tile perceptions of insurance bureaus and insurance regulators in 1970
is illogical. The pollution exclusion would not have been perceived as having the dramatic
impact on coverage it may have in today's climate of environmental liabilities.
5.
That is not to say that the exclusion was not understood as restricting coverage under
certain circumstances. The focus of the occurrence definition was upon harm that was neither
expected nor intended. The language of the pollution exclusion focused on the pollution
discharge, which had to be both "sudden and accidental."
6.
In 1970, there would be no question that "sudden" contained a temporal element of
quickness/abruptness. I cannot conceive how anyone could have understood that "sudden" in
any way included a gradual process or ongoing event.
7.
Consistent with the "sudden" language of the exclusion, the IRB "Explanation"
forthrightly stated there would be continued pollution coverage for an "accident." In 1970,
"accident" was recognized as describing a "boom" event, a catastrophic happening which was
identifiable in time and place. Even though some courts may have seen fit to stretch the
interpretation of the policy term "accident" to include gradual exposures prior to 1970, that
would not have affected insurance bureaus' and insurance regulators' longstanding usage and
understanding of that term. The pollution exclusion, then, returned pollution coverage back to
a pre-1966 "caused by accident" basis.
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8.
Even though the obvious restriction the pollution exclusion carried was clearly
understood, pollution claims were few in 1970. Thus, there would have been no basis to rate
the exposure or request a reduction in premiums. Rates would be adjusted subsequently as loss
data was compiled. This was a common practice in the insurance regulation field.
9.
In
merits of
weighed.
1970 was

South Carolina, we took our responsibility to protect the public very seriously. The
regulatory filings, especially exclusions that could reduce coverage, were seriously
The pollution exclusion was a fair exclusion, and its approval in South Carolina in
appropriate.

10.
There is absolutely no basis in fact for anyone to assert or conclude that insurance
regulators in South Carolina were misled by the explanatory materials submitted by the insurance
bureaus in 1970. The representations made in them were accurate and honest in every respect.

Sworn and Subsc
to
before
is 7-day
of
- - 1993.

Notary Public
My COMMISSION EXPIRES 11.21-1996
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AFFIDAVIT

I, Edward P. Lombard, do depose as follows:
1.
From 1941 to 1956, as Assistant Secretary of the National Union Insurance Company of
Washington, I supervised contacts with agencies, production of policies and maintaining records
necessary to produce the Annual Statement in the form prescribed by the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners. From 1956 to 1970, I served as a Deputy Superintendent of
Insurance for the District of Columbia. In 1970, I was appointed Superintendent of Insurance.
I retired in September of 1973.
2.
My predecessor, Hon. Albert F. Jordan, was the dean of his contemporaries. For some
35 years he was highly regarded by our legislature, the Congress of the United States. His
every effort was directed toward providing a competitive market for the benefit of our residents.
He wrote much of our law. His staff of Casualty actuaries had broad experience in industry.
I worked very closely with this man for 14 years and continued his regulatory approach. I read
every insurance periodical for years. This was necessary so that when I appeared before
Committees or Sub-Committees of the Congress (about 50 times), I was able to field their every
question.
3.
With respect to the Insurance Rating Board's pollution exclusion filing, I saw it. In fact
I reviewed all incoming mail in this rather small jurisdiction. Mr. Haydon, whose signature is
on a May 25, 1970 letter to the Insurance Rating Board, was my Deputy Superintendent of
Insurance. Neither he or I felt any need to move against the filing. It was not misleading or
inaccurate.
4.
In 1970, we understood that "sudden" had a temporal meaning, and was the opposite of
gradual. We also understood at that time the difference between a sudden "accident" and an
occurrence, which could also cover a gradual process. Pollution claims were not common, and
were generally not covered as occurrences. Damage routinely caused in the normal course of
a business' repetitive operations was not an occurrence. My mind goes back to those years at
my summer homes at Sea Isle City and, later, Stone Harbor. It was common knowledge that
the sewage just flowed freely into the sea and the wetlands, and the dump fires on a windless
day had everyone's eyes watering.
5.
With respect to a rate reduction, the exclusion would not have required one. Adjusting
the rate for every form change is surely a fantasy. A rate change for the IRB pollution
exclusion could not have been computed. Pollution loss data was insufficient. In a major rate
case here in the District, the United States Court of Appeals (No. 74-1732, September Term
1974) stated that I "utilized extremely reasonable methodology to reach a complex calculation."
They criticized the "theoretical derivation of regulation" to compute rates, as opposed to reliance
upon actual figures experienced.
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6.
The IRB's explanatory materials confirmed what we understood from the language used
in the pollution exclusion. It was direct and accurate. There was. nothing deceptive or
misleading about the filing.

EDWARD) F. LOMBARD /g:

Subscribed and SW9rn ;V

before me, this P
day of 2,i993.

2.r,;a-,... Lx1 ,,eJ
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Affidavit
1,Thomas L. O'Malley, do depose as follows:
I have been in either the insurance business or in the governmental regulation of
insurance for thirty-seven years (1951-1988). ljoined the Minnesota Insurance Division,
now the Department of Commerce (the "Department"), in 1964. In 1970, 1 was the
Chief Assistant Rate Analyst to Charles Richter, now deceased. He was manager of the
Rates and Forms Section of the Department.
I was later appointed Assistant
Commissioner. I held that position for at least ien years before I retired in 1988. For
a brief period in 1982, 1 was the Commissioner of Insurance.
2.

1 hold two professional designations. I hold a Chartered Property and Casualty
Underwriter ("CPCU") designation, bestowed by the American Institute for Property and
Liability Underwriters. I am also a Certified Insurance Examiner ("CIE"), a designation
awarded by the Insurance Regulatory Examiners Society.

3.

The meaning of certain words are a matter of common knowledge in insurance circles.
These meanings were always well-understood by insurance departments throughout the
country. I know this from my CPCU and CIE studies. "Sudden" is a temporal word
which means "quick/abrupt." "Accident" is a sudden "boom" event. Early liability
insurance was written on a "caused by accident" basis. In 1966, the Bureau expanded
insurance to cover both a sudden "accident" and gradual damage. "Sudden and
accidental" was another way that insurance people described an "accident."

4.

These word usages prevailed within the Department. I know this from my close working
relationship with Charles Richter, and others who handled aspects of general liability
filings. All filings were seriously studied. We took pride in the fair way we managed
insurance regulation in Minnesota.

5.

I have recently reviewed the "sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion clause and the
Explanation which was submitted by the Insurance Rating Board ("IRB") in 1970. 1 do
not presently have clear recall of their filing, but it would have crossed my desk in 1970.
1 no doubt recommended that it be approved since its wording, and that of its
Explanation, are quite clear to me now, and would have been equally clear to me in
1970. The Explanation says only a pollution "accident" is covered. This is the same
concept expressed in the exclusion's "sudden and accidental" language. I do now
understand, and I would have then understood, that all coverage for gradual pollution
discharges was excluded by this filing, even if they were unexpected.

6.

In 1970, 1 would have agreed that existing "occurrence" coverage was clarified by the
exclusion. Most cases of pollution damage at that time were caused by regular,
repetitive business operations. Such pollution damage should be expected. The
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occurrence language would have knocked out such claims. The exclusion clearly
"clarifies" that situation. Whatever gradual discharges were not precluded by the
occurrence definition would be excluded by the pollution exclusion. However, since the
effect of the exclusion would not have substantially impacted the little coverage
realistically available under the "occurrence" definition, in 1970 the reduction in
coverage did not seem at all significant.
7.

Any suggestion that insurance regulators did not understand this filing is wrong. The
words of the exclusion and its Explanation were not misunderstood by me, nor would
they have been misunderstood by Charles Richter. The Department would not have been
led to the erroneous conclusion that the exclusion gny clarified the definition of
"occurrence" and could not restrict coverage in any way.

8.

In 1970, pollution claims were not common. Today's Superfund liabilities did not exist.
Unexpected gradual pollution claims were even more rare. Without adequate loss claim
data, it would be exceedingly difficult to rate the pollution exposure. No rate reduction
would be warranted in 1970. In those days the Department maintained control over the
approval of policy forms. However, we handled rates on a "file and use" basis. In other
words, we allowed free competition in the markets to set rates. Thus, even if this
pollution exclusion filing had dramatically reduced coverage (which it didn't), we would
still not have required a rate adjustment on its approval.

THOMAS L. O'MALLEY
Sworn and Subscribed to
be" me this J7-.day

,'.

CLIFTO A.GU
7.1f OTARYPUBLC-MrN;,N

S

JR
irSOTA'

' Rt V
.4
PAMSEY
COUNTY
My Commission
Expire R-19-96
-- --------
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AFFIDAVIT
I, Elmer V. Omholt, depose as follows:
1.
I was Insurance Commissioner in the State of Montana for over twenty-three years (19611985).
2.
I do not specifically recall the Insurance Rating Board's filing of a "sudden and
accidental" pollution exclusion in 1970. It was just one of many filings made. The topic it
addressed was then not the big issue it is today. I have recently read that exclusion and the IRB
Explanation which accompanied it. I can state without any hesitation that there was and is
nothing misleading about the IRB Explanation. The language ot the exclusion is also clear.
3.
As the exclusion plainly states, a pollution event must be "sudden" as well as fortuitous
to be covered. "Sudden" meant something quick or abrupt. It would certainly not include
something that occurred gradually over time. The exclusion is precisely worded. Only a true
pollution "accident" would be covered. That is exactly what the IRB Explanation confirmed.
An "accident" was a "boom" event, like an explosion.
4.
Pollution claims were extremely rare in 1970. In most cases, those few claims were
already precluded by the coverage limitation the occurrence definition placed on expected or
intended damage. In 1970, it was a matter of common knowledge that damages caused by
routine and repetitive business practices were not covered occurrences. That damage should be
expected, and was a cost of doing business. It was not an insurable risk.
5.
Therefore, while the restrictive language of the exclusion was obvious, that restriction
was not viewed as very significant in the pre-Superfund era of 1970. Today's stringent pollution
laws and regulations were not part of the perspective of those of us in the insurance field back
then. The exclusion indeed clarified in 1970 the general lack of pollution coverage available
under the 1966 CGL occurrence policy.
6.
It makes no sense for anyone to say that the lack of a premium reduction in 1970 meant
that the exclusion lackcd restrictive effect. You cannot redu:cc premiums (or increase them for
that matter) without adequate data. As pollution loss data was yet unavailable, no reduction of
premium would have been indicated in 1970.
7.
My department took its obligation to protect insurance consumers very seriously. I
emphatically reject the notion that there was anything remotely misleading about the IRB
Explanation. The IRB Explanation was straightforward and accurate.

ELMER V. OMHOLT
CN ARY
I
Sworn to before n~fthis

, 4-

day of

.1993.
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AFFIDAVIT

I, Robert D. Preston, do depose as follows:
1.
1 had seventeen years experience in the insurance business before I became an
Assistant Attorney General in Kentucky in 1964. In 1966 1 went over to the Kentucky Insurance
Department as General Counsel. I was the Insurance Commissioner in Kentucky from 1967
through 1971. From 1975 tk.on
1993, 1 served as a member of both the Kentucky Insurance
Assigned Claims Committee and the Kentucky Insurance Guarantee Association Board. From
1976 through 1980, 1 served as a member of the Kentucky Insurance Rate Regulatory Board.
2.
1 do not recall with any specificity the fi:ing and approval of the pollution
exclusion which excluded coverage for all pollution, other than "sudden and accidental"
discharges, in 1970. 1 have, however, reviewed the pollution exclusion and the Insurance Rating
Board's Explanation regarding the exclusion. I can state that the IRB's explanatory materials
were not misleading, and would not have misled the department in 1970.
3.
There would have been no question in 1970 that "sudden" meant quick/abrupt.
It could not have ever been understood as something occurring gradually over time. The IRB
Explanation confirmed this when it stated that coverage would be afforded for a pollution
.accident'. In 1970, an "accident" was understood to be a sudden event, such as a spill. An
.accident" was identifiable in time and place. In contrast, an "occurrence" could also cover
gradual exposures.
4.
Pollution claims were not common back at that time. In most cases, even those
claims would generally be precluded by the language of the occurrence definition. It was
understood that pollution damage resulting from routine normal business operations was or
should have been expected. It was a cost of doing business. The pollution exclusion did clarify
the general lack of pollution coverage in 1970.
5.
Approval of the pollution exclusion in 1970 would not have required a premium
reduction. As pollution claims were rare, there was no body of loss data permitting the
exclusion to be rated. Future premiums would be adjusted as loss data was collected.

ROBERT D. PRESTON
Commonwealth of Kentucky) SS
County of Fayette
)

Sw9n to before me this
Ifdy

of September, 1993.

NOTARY PUBLIC
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AFFIDAVIT
I, Raymond E. Rathert, on my oath, depose and say:
I.

I am presently employed by the State of Kansas, Department of Insurance, as Fire

& Casualty Division Supervisor. I have held this position since 1971.

I have been employed

at the Kansas Department of Insurance since July 1, 1957. My first position at the Department
was Casualty Policy Examiner. In June of 1959, 1 was appointed to the Fire Section as a Fire
Policy Examiner. In January of 1971, the Kansas Commissioner of Insurance appointed me to
my present position as Fire & Casualty Division Supervisor.
2.

1 do generally recollect the filing process of the "sudden and accidental" pollution

exclusion back in 1970.

1 have additionally recently reread the exclusion's language, the

Explanation filed by the Insurance Rating Board ("IRB") and correspondence between the bureau
and the Department.
3.

When the exclusion was first filed for approval, Frank Sullivan was the Insurance

Commissioner. Fletcher Bell succeeded him in early 1971. Mr. Sullivan is deceased. Mr. Bell
retired in 1991. My supervisor, Russell R. Brown, was also involved in the 1970-71 approval
process. However, he passed away in January 1971.
4.

General liability coverage used to be written on an "accident" basis.

We

understood that the term "accident" referred to a distinct event, rather than an ongoing process.
"Occurrence coverage" generally replaced accident coverage. This eliminated the requirement
of "suddenness," but to be insurable, a loss still had to be fortuitous.
5.

When the exclusion was filed, there was no question that "sudden" meant more

to us than just "unexpected."

It expressed an element of brevity. The "boom" theory.
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It was clear to me that the sudden and accidental pollution exclusion was meant

(and was understood) to retain "occurrence" coverage for claims other than those involving
pollutants or contaminants. Pollution claims were to be covered only on the narrower basis of
sudden and accidental.
7.

It is my opinion that the Department was not misled by either the exclusion or the

IRB's explanation. It was obvious that coverage was being reduced. That was why we inquired
about whether the exclusion could be deleted and coverage afforded through a "buy back." We
also would not allow the exclusion to be attached to existing policies because, in our opinion,
it potentially reduced coverage.
8.
in Kansas.
submitted.

To the best of my knowledge, in 1970 no gradual pollution claims had been filed
These type of claims probably started to develop after the 1966 policy was
The earlier "accident" style policies probably would not have covered gradual

pollution claims.
9.

There could be some gradual and fortuitous claims arising from pollution prior

to the approval of the exclusion. The exclusion was designed to clarify the insurers' intent to
not cover gradual pollution.

The current climate of stringent environmental regulation and

enforcement appears to be far different from how it was in 1970.

The actual reduction in

coverage brought about by the exclusion was not thought to be as significant at that time as it
is now because there were no known claims paid under this coverage in the State of Kansas.
10.

Because of the lack of claims, there was not sufficient data available to mandate

a reduction in premiums. In hindsight, I believe that gradual pollution coverage as interpreted
by modern day courts was not reflected in the then existing rates.
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There was a lot of correspondence between IRB and the Department on this issue.

A good part of this correspondence concerned the pollution and contamination exclusion for oil
and gas risks. We believed insurers should provide coverage to those kinds of risks on the same
basis as the sudden and accidental exclusion, ie. to still indemnify insureds for losses, even
catastrophic ones, if they resulted from the classical "boom" accident.
12.

In finally approving both exclusions, the Department insisted that insurers

acknowledge that the excluded risks were "ratable."

In other words, we recognized that it was

not against public policy to insure these exposures and an appropriate rate could be developed.
13.

The Kansas Insurance Department was very conscientious in the consideration of

these filings. We believe our action was in the best interests of the insured public.
14.

I do not believe that Kansas Insurance Department personnel were misled or

tricked into approving the sudden and accidental pollution exclusion in 1970.

Raymond E. Rathert

Sworn and subscribed to
before me thisa__day
of,
1993.
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AFFIDAVIT

1, Milton P. Rice, do depose as follows:
1 was Insurance Commissioner in the State of Tennessee from 1969 to 1971. 1 also
1.
served over twenty-five years as an Assistant Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General
in Tennessee. After I left the Department of Insurance in 1971, I returned to the Attorney
General's Office and was Acting Attorney General for some five months in 1974.
2.
1 believe our insurance department in Tennessee was one of the tougher insurance
departments in the country. We were fair, but (lid not always do what the Insurance Rating
Board wanted. All filings that could potentially impact the coverage of Tennessee insurance
consumers were given serious study.
3.
I do not recall the IRB's pollution cxclusion coming to my attention in 1970. 1 do not
recall my staff having any problems with it. I have recently examined the language of this
exclusion and the Explanation the IRB ttued to describe it. We would not have been misled by
the Explanation in 1970.
4.
The wording of the exclusion was clear. "Sudden" did not mean gradual. It meant quick
or abrupt in a temporal sense. The IR13 Explanation was equally clear. Only a pollution
"accident" would be covered. An "accident" was a sudden event, something identifiable at a
specific time and place.
Under the existing "occurrence" definition, damage which was the natural result of
5.
normal operational business practices was not covered. Expected or intended pollution damage
was not an occurrence. To that extent. the tiewvpollution exclusiot clarified the general lack of
coverage for pollution claims. The significance of its restrictive wording was minimal in 1970.
Only years later would the strict environmental laws we are now familiar with create liabilities
that did not exist back then.
A rate reduction for this exclusion was not indicated in 1970. 1 am unaware of pollution
6.
loss data being available at the time.

MILTON P. RICE
N
RY P LIC
Sw~ to before me this
~j day of October 1993.
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I, Kevin Ryan, depose as follows:

'

1.

t Act u".
1 joined the Illinois State Department of Insurance in 1969 as a
In 1970-71, 1 was the Deputy Director of the Property and Liability B

2.

It has been over twenty-three years since the Insurance Rating Board submitted the
"sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion, and I have no recollection of the events
surrounding that filing. I have had the opportunity to review the language of the
exclusion and the IRB Explanation relating to it.

3.

In 1970, the filing would have been reviewed by our Rating Division staff. Both they
and I would have readily recognized that "sudden," a term used in the pollution
exclusion, described an event that happened abruptly or quickly. It did not describe
something that occurred gradually. We also understood in 1970 the difference
between a sudden "accident," a term used in the IRB Explanation, and an occurrence.

4.

Even under an occurrence policy, damage that was expected or intended was not
covered. I understood in 1970 that there would be no coverage for damage which
was the natural result of the day-to-day operations of an insured. In this respect, the
pollution exclusion would not have been seen as a huge cut-back in coverage, and
clarified the general lack of pollution coverage available in 1970.

5.

There was nothing misleading or deceptive about the insurers' filing of the exclusion
or the explanatory materials. It was a straightforward filing.

6.

During my tenure as an insurance regulator in Illinois, I understood that the lack of
a premium reduction for an exclusion did not demonstrate that an exclusion could
not restrict coverage. This was especially so where loss data had not been sufficiently
developed. In 1970, there were not many pollution claims or related loss data.
Present day pollution laws did not exist at that time.

iTAYPUBLIC
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before me this
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AFFIDAVIT OF JEROME STEEN
I, Jerome Steen, do depose as follows:
1.

I joined the New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance
("Department") in 1956.
In 1970, I was the primary general
liability rate analyst for the Department and was involved in
most of the complex general liability filings, including the
pollution exclusions.

2.

I was a general liability analyst in 1966 when "occurrence"
coverage was introduced on a standard basis. I understood the
difference between the terms "occurrence" and "accident." The
earlier "accident" coverage related to a fortuitous event
identifiable in time, an event which was both sudden/abrupt
and unexpected. "Occurrence" expanded the basis of coverage
to include claims for damages arising out of multiple or
gradual events.

3.

It is my understanding that, with regard to the 1970 pollution
exclusion filings, there now exists opinions that the
Department was either misled by the supporting justification
provided by filers or that it misunderstood the significance
of the subject filings.
Neither consideration is, in fact,
valid, as is indicated here and in Department documents in
connection with these filings.

4.

The initial such filings were made by INA/Pacific Employers in
March of 1970, with subsequent filings made by the IRB and the
MIRB.
As all these filings were substantially similar in
effect and supporting statements, the subsequent filings were
bundled with the INA filing. The Department's disposition of
the INA filing would form the guideline for evaluating any
similar filings.

5.

As the analyst first reviewing the filings, I had no
particular problem or concern with the filers' assertion that
- from their standpoint - this was a clarification of
coverage, in that the filers did not consider that pollution
liability was covered or was not intended to be covered in
most situations by the conventional general liability policy.
I was aware of no information that would contradict that
perception. Claims for environmental damage were not common
at the time.

6.

I also had no particular problem in discerning that - from a
contractual standpoint - the filings introduced specific new
exclusionary language that was sufficiently important to be
evaluated not only in terms of contractual effect but, also,
in terms of public policy considerations.
Our thoughts ran
along many lines, such as: should polluters be protected from
the economic consequences of their intentional acts through
insurance; should payment through insurance be available where
the polluter cannot pay; should insurers pay, but have
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contractual recourse against the insured; should it be a basic
coverage whose cost would be borne by all insureds?
7.

In 1970, I understood "sudden" to mean "quick" in a temporal
I understood that, under certain circumstances, the
sense.
"sudden" language of the exclusion would restrict coverage as
well as clarify the insurance contract with respect to the
insurance industry's perception in 1970 that most gradual
by
already precluded
claims were
pollution discharge
"occurrence" language.

S.

I reviewed the issues of the new exclusionary language and its
public policy considerations with Charles Maier, Chief of the
Rating Division, who sent the matter to the Commissioner's
office for review by counsel and others on the Commissioner's
staff.

9.

Mr. Maier received commentary from Walter Davis, Jr., Director
on the Commissioner's staff, that outlined various public
policy considerations and laws then existing relating to
environmental damage. It was clear that Mr. Davis had serious
misgivings concerning the exclusion's approval.

10.

There were subsequent discussions about the matter among
persons in the Rating Divisions and the Commissioner's office,
in part dealing with the question of whether potential
pollution liability was a matter of "nuisance" (or minor)
claims or something more significant. Ultimately, after all
such considerations, Mr. Maier recommended approval of the
subject exclusions with no immediate rate effect, and such
action was then approved by Acting Commissioner Morgan
Shumake.

11.

Among the reasons for approving the exclusions were:
(a)

While there were differing views, based upon information
then available there was no consensus pro or con as to
the public policy concerns regarding the desirability of
altering the policy to either clarify that certain
coverage was provided or that coverage was not provided
Both options were
for most environmental damage.
considered within the Department at that time. Had the
Department been prescient enough to have foreknowledge of
judicial decisions to come in future years, it is
possible a somewhat different decision might have been
made.

(b)

Based on the sparse data then available, it was the
Department's understanding that claims for environmental
damage were not common events and pertained to only a
narrow class of insureds.

(c)

The generally accepted forms development concept is, in
order to provide the broadest coverage to the greatest
population of insureds at the least cost, that basic
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insurance coverage should be keyed to the common needs of
the many and that the special or extra ordinary needs of
a limited class of insureds is better handled by
supplemental specifically priced endorsements or by other
insurance.
(d)

As both the potential for coverage for nonfortuitous loss
and the actual occurrence of loss appeared at that time
to be quite limited, the application of the subject
exclusions conformed to this forms coverage development
concept. We believed this change would limit coverage to
liability arising out of sudden fortuitous events,
shifting the cost of general environmental damage
coverage of those insureds that might have special need
for
such
coverage
to
other
specific
insurance
instruments.

12.

As to the lack of an immediate rate adjustment to reflect the
subject change, there was no meaningful loss data then
available to formulate a retrospective rate adjustment for the
general liability line.
Nor was there a basis for
apportioning any reduction among classes, based upon the
relative effect of the change on differing classes.

13.

In such circumstances, it was an accepted
existing rates to prevail, based on the
future experience would reflect whatever
provisions might have and, accordingly,
downward or upward based upon the actual
the classes or classifications that would

14.

As my April 20, 1970 memorandum reflects, I was aware that, as
a result of the proposed pollution exclusion, it was possible
that the costs of excluded environmental damage could fall on
the State or other governmental agency when a policyholder,
not otherwise insured by other specific insurance instruments,
was not in a financial position to pay for such loss.

15.

Whatever prospective twenty plus years after the fact might
bring to consideration of the Department's actions in 1970,
the Department invested considerable effort and time in
evaluating the subject exclusions.
The Department was not
ignorant, inept,
indifferen
*to ethical and statutory
obligations, or misled in ma in
its determination in this
matter.
Jet m6tfen

Sworn to before me this /7
August, 1993

day

f

Notary Publ €c_

NOTARY PUBLC OF NEW JERSEY
My Conmission Expires Marcn 18, 1g97

3

procedure to allow
consideration that
effect the subject
rates would flow
specific effect on
be affected.
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1, Melvin I. Summerhays. do depose as follows:
I. I began my insurance career in 1951 as a casualty agent for State Farm Insurance Company.
In 1959 I left State Farm and joined an independent insurance agency in Salt Lake City, Utah.
I joined the State of tah )epartment of Insurance ("the Department") in 1970 as the general
liability rates and forms analyst. I held that position until I retired in 1979.
2. We were a small department in those (lays. I handled all of the general liability filings
myself. I discussed these matters with Commissioner Ottesen, but he always took my
recommendations. Our job was to protect the puhlic. At the same time we were mindful to
consider proposed Bureau filings fairly. II use "Bureau" to mean the Insurance Rating Board
(IRB) which later changed its name to ISO. I We had an on-going dialogue with the local Bureau
office. If a problem developed over a Bureau matter I would just call and work it out with them.
3. While I do not actually recall the "sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion, it would have
been handeled by me. I have now reviewed that exclusion and the Bureau's Es.lnaFion.
4. The pollution exclusion the _l&laalIiu are simple, clearly worded documents. They used
language in 1970 that I was long familiar with. "Sudden" was something "abrupt" or "quick".
An "accident" was a sudden event which happened by chance. An "occurrence" was defined in
the policy to cover gradual damage and also an "accident"- "Sudden and accidental" referred
to an "accident". not to an "occurrence".
5. In 1970 1 would certainly have understood these pollution exclusion documents in line with
the way I understood the words they used. The language was so obvious there would have been
no reason for me to ask the Bureau office what it meant. Clearly, coverage for gradual pollution
discharges would be excluded. The only exception was coverage for "sudden and accidental"
pollution discharges. The Ex,_anatiQ also said the only thing now covered was a pollution
"accident". It was the same thought.
6. It is hard for me to understand how this language can be said to be confusing. To read it any
other way is to just disregard plain policy language. I can say without any reservation that I
would not have been misled by the Bureau's ixLQJanakon. There is no basis whaLsoever for
anyone to think I was misled.
7. While I am sure pollution was taking place at that period of time, I don't think we ever had
a pollution claim. I always thought repetitive business pollution was a cost of doing business.
The damage it caused would most likely be expected. The first sentence of the Explanation
indicates the Bureau thought so also.
8. Of course on-going business pollution also causes gradual pollution discharges in addition to
the exclusion clearly "clarifies" the existing
expected damage. As stated in the xpna .n.
situation that pollution would not be covered. Certainly the exclusion would also apply as well
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to any unexpected gradual pollution discharges, if any.
9. Since the restriction of coverage to only sudden pollution accidents did not really reduce the
actual amount of existing coverage under an "occurrence", no rate reduction would have been
warranted. With no loss experience for pollution claims even under "occurrence" language, a
premium adjustment for the gradual pollution exclusion would not have been considered.
10. My approval of this exclusion helped contain the cost of insurance. Besides, businesses did
not expect to have pollution coverage under their general liability policies except for a true
"accident". The exclusion was fair and appropriate for endorsement to policies in Utah.

MELVIN L. SLTN0ERtHAYS

Subscribed and sworn to
before me, this
day of September, 1993.

,
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I, MILTON S. TROXELL, do depose as follows:
1 served as Director, General Liability-Casualty Division, of the Texas Board of
Insurance from 1968 to 1987.
2.

1 have reviewed correspondence directed to me by the Insurance Rating Board in 1970.
1 have also reviewed the language of the "sudden and accident" pollution exclusion and
the Insurance Rating Board's "Explanation" pertaining to that exclusion. While I do not
specifically recall the details of this situation, which took place over twenty years ago,
I do generally recall the context in which terms utilized in these materials were used in
1970. I also generally recall the coverage then available for pollution at that time.

3.

On April 20, 1970, a manager for the Insurance Rating Board, R.G. Foster, wrote a
letter (attached) to me about the IRB pollution exclusion. Mr. Foster, who I always
regarded as extremely intelligent, honest and forthright, advised that the exclusion would
apply to all bodily injury or property damage arising from pollution "except when
pollution results from the classical accident."

4.

The IRB did subsequently submit such a pollution exclusion, which excluded all pollution
claims unless they arose out of a "sudden and accidental" discharge. The accompanying
IRB "Explanation" stated that there would still be coverage for a pollution "accident."
In 1970, i understood all of these terms ("sudden", "classical accident" and "accident")
to mean the same thing. What was required was a quick or abrupt event, something
identifiable in both time and place.

5.

In 1970, pollution claims were rare. Today's environmental laws and liabilities didn't
exist. In addition, most of those pollution claims would have been precluded by existing
language in the occurrence definition (no coverage for damages which were expected or
intended). The pollution exclusion did clarify that coverage situation. Therefore, even
though the exclusion would exclude coverage for all gradual pollution discharge claims,
it was not viewed as a significant restriction of existing coverage.

6.

Nothing in the IRB "Explanation" was misleading, nor was the Texas Board of Insurance
misled by the explanatory materials.

7.

As pollution claims were rare in 1970, there was no loss data available. The Board of
Insurance would have had no reason to inquire about or demand a reduction in premiums
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based upon loss
when the exclusion was approved. Future premiums would be adjusted
on.
later
data acquired

MILTON S. TROXELL

Sworn and Subscribed to
bo me this/day
o -eptemb~er 1993

Notary Publific
/
JAE .NIXON
otayPu
h , STATE OFTEXASI
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I, Samuel H. Weese, do depose as follows:
From 1969 to 1975, 1 held the position of Insurance Commissioner of West Virginia.
In July of 1970, a hearing was held regarding the effect of various exclusions offered
for approval including the qualified "sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion
submitted by the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau and the Insurance Rating Board.
2.

1did not actively participate at the hearing or in the pre-hearing or post-hearing filing
process. Although present at the hearing, as Insurance Commissioner, I appropriately
delegated the filing process to others. I was not involved in the discussions of the
legal complexities underlying the coverages provided by the policies as amended by
the addition of the proposed pollution exclusion. I recall entering the hearing with the
belief that coverage was generally excluded for normal operational polluting events
and premiums charged did not reflect such coverage under the 1966 CGL policy. I
also recall leaving the hearing with an assumption that, with the addition of the
pollution exclusion, there continued to be no general coverage for normal operational
polluting events. Therefore, without additional analysis, I assumed that the exclusion
did not alter coverage, as none was intended initially.

3.

The affidavit executed by me on November 11, 1988 in the FMC v. Liberty Mutual
case does not accurately reflect my recollection as it tends to suggest that my
involvement was extensive and that my memory of events was clear. In fact, my
involvement was minimal and my recollection is only that there was generally no
coverage for polluting events. To go further would be to misrepresent my involvement
in and my memory of such events.

4.

In 1970, 1understood that a "sudden" event was one which was identifiable in time and
place. I also knew that an "accident" was an insurance term which contained a
"sudden" element. In addition, I understood that the language of the occurrence
definition focused upon unexpected or unintended damage.

5.

The fact that the pollution exclusion was approved in West Virginia only as applicable
to new or renewal policies and could not be attached to existing policies tends to
indicate that the exclusion was generally perceived as a restriction.

SAMUEL H. WEESE

Dated:

otI
Public

I

(

c
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AFFIDAVIT

I, Broward Williams, do depose as follows:
1.

I was insurance commissioner in the State of Florida between
I first joined the State Treasury and
1965 and 1971.
Insurance Commission (the "Insurance Department") in 1938 as
Administrative Assistant.

2.

It was my policy to handpick experienced and very competent
They were
insurance staff for the Insurance Department.
I was a
schooled and sophisticated in insurance matters.
believer that people working for the Insurance
great
Department must be well educated in the field they were
employed to handle on behalf of the citizens of Florida. This
concept was reflected in the significant budget we were
allocated by the legislature, which was sought and approved
based upon our representation that we wanted to retain the
most competent employees in the field.

3.

the
general
liability policy covered
to
1966,
Prior
"accidents", which were "boom" events that occurred suddenly
or abruptly. "Accidents" were fortuitous events identifiable
in time and place. The 1966 CGL "occurrence" policy broadened
coverage to include gradual exposures as long as the damage
was not intended or expected. These meanings were a matter
of common knowledge in the Insurance Department at the time.

4.

The term "sudden", as used in the 1970 pollution exclusion,
meant quick or abrupt in a temporal sense. This was also a
matter of common knowledge in the Insurance Department at the
time.

5.

I do not hav,! a precise recollection of the filing of the
I have however, reviewed the
pollution exclusion in 1970.
Explanation ;ubmitted to the Insurance Department in 1970.
It states that the pollution exclusion continued to provide
coverage for a pollution "accident". In 1970, the Insurance
Department would have readily recognized from the explanatory
materials that pollution coverage would be returned to a
sudden accident or "boom" basis. Only pollution events that
were fortuitous and identifiable in time and place would be
covered.

6.

It was perceived that
In 1970, pollution claims were rare.
claims for most cases of gradual pollution would already be
precluded by the language of the occurrence definition. The
restrictions carried by the exclusion would not have been
viewed as significant in 1970. It was appropriate to describe
how the exclusion clarified coverage at that time.
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7.

There is no basis in fact to conclude that the Insurance
Department was misled in any respect by the Explanation
Careful
submitted to it by the insurance bureaus in 1970.
attention was given to the approval of any exclusion submitted
My staff and I conferred and
to the Insurance Department.
deliberated carefully over the appropriateness of approving
policy exclusions.

8.

There was no reason why premiums would have had to be reduced
In 1970, pollution claims
when the exclusion was approved.
were so uncommon that adequate loss data was unavailable.
Premiums would be adjusted over time as sufficient loss data
and claims experience was compiled.

Broward WilliamgSworn to before me this
25th Day of August, 1993.
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